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ABSTRACT 
The st udy explores  the information aggrega tion properties o f  
experiment a l  market s  i n  which a ful ly revealing rational expecta tions 
equil ibrium exist s. In sing l e  s ecurities marke t s  in which trade r s  
have dif f erent pref erence s  information aggregation seems to be m inimal 
and rationa l expectations equil ibria are not a t tained. If the marke t 
h a s  a compl ete set of contingent c l a im s  securities or if preferenc e s  
a r e  ident ical the rationa l expe ctations equil ibrium mode l works wel l. 
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I ,  INTRODUCTION 
In this paper w e  explore the information aggrega t ion 
properties of marke t organiz ation that recent mathematica l  theoriz ing 
sugg e s t s  might exist , Economist s h av e  l ong recogniz ed that m ar ke t s ,  
if properly o.rganiz ed, can b e  a n  efficient confl ict resolution device
for a giv en pattern of attitude s ,  In a ddition, the idea that marke t  
proce s s e s  may involve value form ation ( the endogenous formation of 
l imit pric e s  and demand function s ) , thereby departing f rom an 
a s sumption o f  fixed a tt itude s, was introduc e d  many years a go ,  
Howev er, the idea that value formation, t o  the extent i t  refl e c t s  
e xpectations formation, may involve a sp e c t s  of  efficiency and that 
organiz ations m ight aggregate and dis s eminate information whil e a l so 
re solving conf l ic t s  is a product of the modern mathematic a l  l iterature 
on decent r a l iz ation (Hurwicz 197 2)  and on rationa l exp e c t a t ions ( Luca s  
1972) • 
That m arke t s  might rea sonably be expected  to efficient ly 
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resolve conf l ic t s  h a s  been demonst rated many times  in the expe riment a l  
economics l itera tur e ,  Recent expe riment s (Forsythe,  Pal frey, and 
Plott 1982; and Pl ott and Sunder 1982 )  hav e demonstrated that marke t s  
c a n  a l so dis s eminate information ef ficient ly. In this paper we  
a ddress the more complic a te d  a nd subt l e  is sue of information 
aggregation when different t raders h av e  diverse information about an 
underlying s t a t e  of na ture , The situation is one in which no trader 
knows the state of  nature but if traders pool their information, th e 
state can be ident ified a nd, subj ect to the usual cav e a t s  a bout side­
payment s ,  the wel fare of all improved, Rational expect a tions mode l s  
suggest  that marke t s  might b e  used t o  a ccompl ish this r e sul t even 
though trade r s  a r e  unabl e to communica te information directly and ev en 
though trade r s  h av e  no obvious incentiv e  to unil a ter al ly reveal  what 
they know, The e xp eriment s r eport e d  below expl ore the pos s ibil ity , 
The information a ggrega tion in the marke t s  described l a ter is 
of the fol l owing form ,  Rewards to traders depended upon purch a s e s  and 
s a l e s  of  singl e-per iod s e curities and an unobs erved s t a t e  parameter , 
The sta te parameter  coul d t ake three values {x, y, and z} a nd a l l  
trade r s  h a d  some information about the underlying state prior t o  a ny 
trading a ct iv ity, but no one knew the state w ith certainty . For 
exampl e ,  if the s t a t e  was  x, then some trade r s  knew for certa in that 
the state was not y and other trader s  knew for certain the state w a s  
not z ;  but no one w a s  inform ed t h a t  it was  x .  Thus the state  coul d b e  
identified w ith c e rtainty through a proper aggrega tion of a l l  
avail abl e informa tion in the marke t.  The que stion posed is how 
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marke ts might foster this a ggrega tion, 
Prev ious experiment s have demonst rated the power of the 
rational expecta tions ( RE) mode l ,  so we began with the working (nul l )  
hypothesis that with repl ica tion the predict ions of  the ra tiona l 
expectations model woul d be rea sonably accur ate . The f irst 
exp eriment s ( s e ries A) l ed us to r ej ect this idea and forced us to 
proceed on the oppo site pre sumption that a ggregation as suggested by 
th e model wil l never occur , With this per spe ctive a se cond s e t  of 
experimenta l  marke t s  ( se rie s B )  in which a compl ete s e t  of sta te­
contingent se curities were trade d was  de signed.  Our discovery tha t  
this s econd s eries of  marke t s  behave subs t ant ial ly a s  pr edict e d  by the 
RE model l ed us to de sign a third series ( series C) o f  singl e  c ompound 
se curity marke t s  in which payof f s  of a se curity in a s t a te w ere 
identical across all  hol der s ,  The fact that  both the s e cond and third 
s e rie s performe d  a s  forec a s t  by the RE model l ea ds us to suspe ct that 
the existence of instrum ent s which introduce some abil ity of tra de r s  
t o  a t tribute the a ctions o f  others  to a sourc e  o f  motiv a tion is 
important to the informa tion a ggregation function of  marke t s ,  
I n  the ne xt, se cond, section the experiment a l  d e s ign, 
parameters,  and proce dures a r e  introduced. The third s e ct ion out l ine s 
a rational expectations model and two competing mode l s  which wil l  help 
us orga niz e the data , The data f rom all serie s are  pre sent e d  in the 
fourth section and a nalyzed in t erm s of  the maj or predictions of the 
mode l s  about pric e s, al l oca tions, prof it s  a nd ef ficiency . It a l so 
contains a discus s ion of a spe ct s of behavi�r which m ay help in the 
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dev el opment of a ful ly appropri ate model ,  A f i f th section cont ains  a 
discus s ion of several parameters  which may vary across e xperiment s and 
our attempt s t o  expl a i n  why th e compl ete marke t s  for state  cont ingent 
securi ties  s e em better abl e to a ggregate div erse inf ormat ion, The 
f inal section i s  a summary of conclusions.  
II. MARKET DESIGN
A total of e l even marke t s  (plus one pilot ) were stud i e d ,  Nine 
of the marke t s  (1 , 2, 3 ,  6 through 11 ) invol ved a s i ngl e a s s e t .  Some 
of these marke t s  had diverse div idends (1 , 2 ,  3 ,  6 ,  1 0 ,  11 ) a nd are  
ref erenced as  series  A.  Some of the m arke t s  had uni form div idends ( 7 ,  
8 ,  9 )  and a r e  r e f erenc e d  a s  ser i e s  C ,  The other two marke t s  ( 4  and 5 )  
had a compl e t e  s e t  o f  cont i ngent c l aims during the f irst nine periods 
( indexed 4-CC a nd 5-CC) fol l owed by several periods i n  whi ch only a 
sing l e  compound s e curi ty coul d be traded ( indexed 4-S and 5-S) , The 
cont i ngent cl aims portions of these marke t s  are  ref erenced a s  seri e s  B 
and the s ingl e s e curi ty portions are  grouped in seri e s  A. The 
numeri ca l  indexing of the marke t s  refl ect s the sequence in whi ch the 
marke t s  were conducted a nd to some extent the experi ence of subj ect s, 
but f or purpo s e s  of ana ly s i s  the marke t s  will be rearranged as series  
A, B, and  C .  
Each marke t  was  conducted f or several periods and in e a ch 
period s e cur i t i es with one-period l iv e s  were trade d ,  Each secur i ty 
paid a singl e div i dend to the holder at the end of the period.  The se 
dividends differed across trade r s  ( except in marke t s  7 ,  8 ,  and 9 )  and 
depend e d  upon the state of na tur e ,  The diff erenc e s  in div ide nds and 
in expecta ti ons about the underlying s ta te of na ture l ed t o  the 
exist ence of gains f rom trade sim i l a r  to tho se induced by the 
differenc e s  in a t t i tude s towards ri sk, wealth, and/or portfol io 
po s i t ions . The marke t s  were organi z ed a s  oral doubl e auctions,  
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Subj ect s were student s a t  the Gradua te S chool of Bus ine s s  a t  
the Univer s i ty o f  Chi c a go,  th e Indi an Insti tute o f  Mana gem en t  in 
Ahm edabad, and graduate and undergraduate student s a t  the Cal iforni a 
Inst i tute of Techno l ogy , Experience varied a cross marke t s , As shown 
in Tabl e 1 ,  parti cipa nt s  in m arke t  1 had no prev ious e xperienc e ,  In 
marke t  2 subj ect s had parti cipated in e i th er m arke t 1 or the pilot,  
Simil arly, subj ect s i n  m arke t s  5 and  6 had  the experi ence gaine d  f rom 
participa ting i n  one of marke t s  3 or 4. Inexpe ri enced subj ect s in 
m arket 7 b e cam e the experi enc e d  subj ect s who parti c ipa ted i n  marke t s  8 
and 11 . Subj ect s in m arke t  9 had e xperi ence f rom unrel a te d  l abora tory 
marke ts and in marke t 10 the subj ect s were those  who parti cipated i n  
m arke t 9 ,  
II,1 Pre ferenc e s  and A s s e t s  
Instruc t i ons, procedur e s  f or training s ubj ects,  t h e  method o f  
inducing preference s, and other de ta i l s  o f  experimental procedure were 
l ike those us e d  i n  Plott and Sunder (198 2 ) , Each trader, i ,  was 
Market 
1 
2 
3 
4 
(contingent c l aims 
Loca tiona 
I\ Subject
S e rio a Experience 
A UC (inexperienc e d )  
U C  
A ( e xperienced in 
market 1 or pil ot )  
A CIT 
( inoxporionced) 
CIT 
periods 1 -9) B ( inoxporienood) 
( sing l e  se curity 
periods 1 0-13) A 
( contingent c l aims 
periods 1 -9) B 
CIT 
( experienced in 
Market 3 or 4 )  ( singl e se curi ty 
p e riod1 1 0-16) A 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0  
1 1  
CIT 
A ( e xperienced in 
Market 3 or 4 )  
c IIM 
(inexp e rience d )  
IIM 
C ( experienced in 
marke t 7) 
c CIT 
(inexperienced) 
CIT 
A ( e xperienced in 
marke t 9) 
IIM 
A (experienced in 
mark.et 7 6. 8) 
Trader 
Type 
II 
I 
II 
I 
II 
I 
II 
III 
I 
II 
III 
I 
II 
III 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
III 
I 
II 
III 
Num ber 
TABLll 1 :  DESIGN OF MARKETS 
of Initial Endowment Fixed Cost Dollar Divid ends Probabilities 
Tra d e r• C ertif icates Francs (Francs) per Franc x y z x y 
4 2 1 0  ,000 
4 2 1 0,000 
4 2 1 0,000 
4 2 1 0,000 
4 2 1 0  ,000 
4 2 1 0,000 
4 2 1 0,000 
4 2 1 0,000 
4 2 1 0,000 
4 1 5 ,000 
4 1 5 ,000 
4 lS ,000 
4 4 16 ,000 
4 4 16 ,000 
4 4 16 ,000 
1 2  4 25 ,000 
1 2  2 25 ,000 
1 2  4 2 5 ,000 
4 4 16 ,000 
4 4 16 ,000 
4 4 16 ,000 
4 2 16 ,000 
4 2 16 ,000 
4 2 16 ,000 
1 0,000 
1 0,000 
1 0,000 
1 0,000 
1 0,000 
1 0,000 
1 0,000 
1 0,000 
1 0,000 
lS ,000 
15 ,000 
lS,000 
16 ,000 
16 ,000 
16 ,000 
2S ,OOO 
2S ,OOO 
2S ,OOO 
16 ,000 
16 ,000 
16 ,000 
16 ,000 
16 ,000 
16 ,000 
0 , 003 70 16 0 3 00 
0 . 3 5  0 , 2 0  0.4S 
0 , 003 23 0 9 0  6 0  
0 , 003 1 00 3 3 0  1 9 0  
0 , 3 S  0 . 4 S  0 , 2 0  
0 . 003 26 0 9 0  1 2 0  
0 . 003 70 16 0 3 00 
0 ,3 5 0 . 2 0  0 .45 
0. 003 23 0 9 0  6 0  
0,003 70 13 0 3 00 
0 . 003 23 0 9 0  6 0  0.3 S 0 . 2 0  0.4S 
0 , 003 1 00 16 0 200 
0 , 0025 1 4 0  26 0 6 00 
0 . 0025 46 0 1 8 0  1 2 0  1 /3 1 /3 1 /3 
0 ,0025 2 00 3 2 0  4 00 
0 , 001 25 so 240 5 9 0  
0 , 00125 1 70 4SO 1 1 0  1 /3 1 /3 1 /3 
0. 00125 3 1 0 1 90 3 90 
o . 001 sc so 240 4 9 0 1 /3 1 /3 1 /3 
o . 001sc 12S 3 1S S25 1 /3 1 /3 1 /3 
o . 001 s so 240 4 9 0  0 , 3 S  0.4S 0 . 2 0  
0 , 001 25 2 4 0  s o  S 9 0  
o . 001 2 s  4 S O  1 70 1 1 0
0 , 001 25 1 9 0  3 1 0  3 9 0  
o . 0012 sc s o  2 4 0  S 9 0
o . 00125 C 1 70 45 0 1 1 0
0 , 001 25 c 3 1 0  1 9 0  3 90 
1 /3 1 /3 1 /3 
1 /3 1 /3 1 /3 
a, UC= University of Chicago; CIT= California Institute of Technology; IIM = Indian Institute of Manag em ent , 
b. 2 in complete markets (periods 1-9), 4 in single-security markets (periods 1 0-1 6 ) ,
c .  Rup e e  per franc for markets 7, 8 ,  and 1 1 . 
Expected Diyidends 
No Not Not Not 
Information x y 
1 91 .S 
1 2S . s  
221 . s  
1 S S  .S 
1 9 1 . S  
1 2S . S  
1 8 S  , S  
1 2 S  . s  
1 S 7 . 0  
3 3 3  
253 
3 07 
293 
243 
2 9 7  
26 0 
3 42 
223 . s  
293 
243 
2 9 7  
293 
243 
2 9 7  
2 5 7  1 9 9  1 03 
69 1 3 4  1 79 
287 133 229 
9 9  209 1 6 4  
2 5 7  1 9 9  1 03 
6 9  1 3 4  1 79 
248 1 9 9  92 
69 1 3 4  1 79 
188 156 122 
43 0 3 70 200 
150 290 3 20 
3 6 0  3 00 26 0 
41S 3 2 0  14S 
28 0 140 3 1 0  
2 9 0  3 S O  2 5 0  
3 6 S  2 70 14S 
4SO 3 25 25 0 
3 1 7  21 0 1 S 7  
3 2 0  41S 1 4S 
140 28 0 3 1 0  
3SO 2 9 0  2 5 0  
415 3 20 145 
28 0 140 3 1 0  
2 9 0  3 5 0  2SO 
5 a 
6 
assigned a dollar redemption function of the form: 
Rt I: t + I: pit - I: pit+ t i 'Yi [ai + dai (St)xai s p Ci], a s p 
Bi ( O ,  dai (St) 0, y i)O,
t L o. xai 
i s..{) = the set of traders. 
a 8 a= set of types of securities. 
set of states of nature. 
dollar earnings of trader i in period t. 
units of security of type a held by trader i at the end of 
period t (end of period short sales were prohibited so 
t xi 2 0 ) , is the initial endowment of securities plus 
purchases less sales in period t, 
the dividend rate of type a security in francs for trader 
i expressed as a function of the state of nature 9. 
revenue from sales of securities during period t. 
cost of securities purchased during period t. 
initial endowment of cash in francs. 
fixed cost in francs. In general ai < 0 because initial 
endowments of securities and francs were of substantial 
value. 
conversion rate of francs (experimental currency) into 
U.S. dollars. 
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If a trader has a positive utility for money, (s)he would like 
R� as large as possible. Derived demand induces values on securities 
1 
which, in turn, can be used as parameters in the models of market 
behavior. 
Constraints on decisions of traders were es follows. At the 
beginning of each period each trader was given an initial endowment of 
working capital (C�) which was sufficiently large never to be binding. 1 
Each trader was also given an initial endowment of securities (� �) ofa1 
each type a. Short positions were permissible (in markets 4 through 
1 1  but not in markets 1 ,  2, or 3 )  during a trading period, but no one 
11 d t i h t t th d f th . d 1 was a owe o rema n s or a e en o e per10 • 
supp ly of each type of security was fixed at � �a1 • 
II.2 Information 
Thus the 
The information structure of the markets was the same across 
all markets. Traders were publicly told that the selection of the 
state each period depended upon a draw from a bingo cage and they were 
trained through preliminary draws to guess the events which were to 
have led to various states of nature (see Plott and Sunder 1982 for 
procedures and instructions). In fact, the state in all markets was 
picked from a predetermined sequence of draws made in advance of the 
experiment. Draws from the bingo cage were conducted each period and 
the proportions of states were the same as the stated probabilities 
but the announced states were those of the predetermined sequence. We 
have no evidence which leads us to suspect that subjects disbelieved 
the mechanism, 
No subject knew the dividends of any other subject, The 
number of informed traders and the type of information were both 
public, The method of distributing information (based on a random 
number table) was public, 
In all cases there were three states x, y, and z 
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(0 = (x, y, z}), As outlined above we postulate that a probability 
distribution P (D), D e  (x, y, z} represents the beliefs of all traders 
about the chances of the occurrence of each state in any period, At 
the beginning of the period the state was drawn, Information given to 
traders was as follows: if the state was, say, x, then half of the 
traders knew with certainty that the state was not y and the others 
knew with certainty that the state was not z, Furthermore, all 
traders knew that the identity of the traders who received each clue 
was determined according to a random number table (see Appendix 1 for 
the method), The probability that any given trader receives the clue 
"not y, " given that the state is x, is one-half, etc. 
11,3 Parameters 
The actual parameters for each experiment are contained in 
Table 1 ,  In the first three markets traders were partitioned into two 
types (designated I and II) according to dividend payoffs and, in 4 ,
S, 6 ,  1 0 ,  and 11 , three types (designated I, II, and III), In all 
these markets there were four traders of each type, Thus in each of 
the first three markets there were eight traders and in all other 
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markets there were twelve. In markets 7 ,  8 ,  and 9 there was only one 
type of trader but there were twelve traders of this type, Each 
period each trader had an initial endowment of two securities except 
in markets 5 -S, 6 ,  and 9 where each trader had four. The initial cash 
endowments given to traders each period, the fixed cost and 
dollar/franc (or rupee/franc) exchange, are all listed in the ·table, 
Many of these variations reflected what we had learned from the 
preceding experiments. For example, the initial endowment and 
therefore the total supply of securities was doubled from market 3 to 
market 6 ,  Had market 6 converged to the RE equilibrium, we would have 
suspected that volume might be a critical variable and we would have 
pursued volume as a treatment variable in the later experiments, 
The structure of dividends differed between the contingent 
claims and the single security organizations, Consider first the 
single security case in which t/., the set of types of securities, 
contains only a single element, The dividends paid at the end of a 
period on a single security differ according to the state of nature 
revealed for that period and the type of trader holding the security, 
Take, for example, period 10 of market 4 in which only a single 
security existed, Any security held by, say, a type II trader yielded 
a dividend to the holder of 230 francs if the state was x, 90 francs 
if the state was y, and 60 francs if the state was z, The dividend 
returns to other types can also be read from Table 1 .
Organization of the contingent claims markets is a little 
different. In these cases there were three different securities, so 
a conta ine d  three e l ement s ,  For conveni ence the s e cur i t i e s  were
cal l ed x, y, and z ,  i , e , ,  (x, y, z}, a s  were the corre sponding 
s t a t e s ,  The x s e cur i t i e s  y ielded a po s i tive div idend if x oc curred 
and z ero oth erw i s e ,  The y secur i ty yielded a po si tive div idend i f  y 
occurred and z ero otherw i se, e t c ,  Again, reading f rom Ta ble 1 the 
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div idend st ruc t ure f or a type II t rader during period 1 of marke t 4-CC 
when m arke t s  f or a. compl e t e  set of state cont i ngent cl aims were 
operative, we get the f o l l ow ing : for such a trader ( dxi ( x )  = 23 0 ,  
d i ( y) = 0 ,  d i ( z) = O ) ;  ( d  . ( x )  = O , d i ( y) = 90 , d i ( z) = O ) ;x x y1 y y 
( dz i ( x )  = O , dz i ( y) = 0 ,  dz i ( z) = 60 ) , The div idend s t ructure for a l l  
other traders c a n  b e  de term ined s imil arly from Tabl e 1 .
III.  COMP ETING MODELS OF SECURITY BEHAVIOR 
Three different model s  a r e  exam ine d a s  candi date expl ana tions 
of the behav ior of the se se cur i ty marke t s .  Of cour se the ent i re 
proj ect was  motivated by the f irst mode l ,  the ful ly reveal ing rationa l 
expectations equil ibr ium (RE) in whi ch bel i e f s  are endo genous ly 
dev e l oped, The two other model s,  the pr ior i nf ormation equil ibrium 
( P l )  and maximin (MM), ut i l iz e  exogenously formed be l i ef s and both are 
known f rom other expe riment s (Plott and Sunder 1 98 2 )  t o  be l e ss 
rel i abl e than RE, They are used here as a l terna t iv e s  aga inst which to 
ev aluate RE, In a ddi t i on, both mode l s  coul d be used a s  sta rting 
point s  in dynam i c  mode l s  of formation of rati onal expectations; so 
both are of independent int er e st . 
1 1  
III . 1  Rat ional Expectat ions (RE) 
The c entral  principl e of thi s  mode l is the f ul ly reveal ing 
r a t i ona l exp e c t a t i ons hypo the s i s  (RE): a l l  traders choose i n  
equil ibrium a s  i f  they a r e  aware o f  the poo l e d  inform at i on o f  a l l  
traders in the sy st em regarding t h e  unde rly ing state , Thi s  pr inc ipl e 
i s  suppl em ent e d  w i th the st a ndard princ ipl e s  -0f demand a nd supply a s  
appl ied t o  competi tiv e marke t s ,  
Under these a s sumpt i ons a n  RE mode l can e a s i ly b e  derived for 
the marke t s  de scribed in the s e c t i on abov e ,  I n  a l l  sta t e s  the pool e d  
i nformation w i l l  ident ify t h e  state  w ith certa inty ( ha l f  of the 
traders can e l imina te one of three  sta t e s  w ith certa i nty and the other 
h a l f  can e l imina te another ) ,  Under compe t i t iv e  cond i t i ons demands are 
perf ectly el a s t i c  at the div idend rate ( a s suming no transact i on cost ) . 
The supply i s  f ixe d ,  
The pri c e  and a l l oc a t i on predi ctions of thi s  model for each 
ma rke t a r e  l i s t ed i n  Tabl e 2 in row s  marked RE. In a ny given state 
the equil ibrium pr i c e  is the h i gh e st div i de nd in that state  and the 
secur i t i e s  are  held  by the traders who have that high div idend 
potent i al .  In marke t 1 ,  for exampl e,  the rationa l expe ctati ons model 
pr edict s a pri c e  of 23 0 francs when the s t a te is x a nd it a l so 
predi cts  that a l l  secur i t i e s  w i l l  be held by type II t r ade r s ,  In 
market 4 th e r a t i ona l exp e c t a t i ons model predi ct s, when the state i s  
x ,  that th e pr i c e  o f  the x ,  y ,  and z secur i t i e s  w il l  b e  23 0 ,  0 ,  and 0 ,  
re spe ctiv ely , All o f  th e x s e curi t i e s  woul d, according to  thi s  mode l ,  
b e  held by type I I  traders a nd there shBuld be n o  trade s in the other 
M a r lr. o t  
1 and 3 
( ain1lo 1oen rity) 
2 
( 1in1lo soeu r i ty) 
4 -CC 
( e ontin1o nt e lai111 ) 
4 -S 
( s ingle 1oon rity) 
s-cc 
(oontin1ont e lai111 ) 
s-s 
( 1ln1lo secu rity) 
6 and 11 
( s i ngle soeu rlty ) 
7 
(uniform dlvld ond1 
slnglo 1oeu rlty ) 
8 
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TABLE 2 :  PRICE AND ALLO CA T ION PREDICTIONS 
plyo r10 Information 
Dlv orso Informat ion 
No about tho Stnto 
Inform a t i on 1 y 
1 91 .S 
1 91 .S 
7 0  
221 . s  
2 2 1 .s 
1 00 
8 0.S 
32 
13 5 
8 0.S 
3 2  
13 5 
0 
0 
0 
185 . s  
1 8 S  .5 
100 
153 
1 07 
2 00 
1S3 
107 
2 00 
0 
0 
0 
333 
333 
2 00 
2 97 
2 97 
1 90 
26 0 
26 0 
so 
342 
342 
1 25 
223 .s 
223 . s  
so 
2 97 
2 9 7  
1 9 0  
2 3 0  
1 9 9  
9 0  
26 0 
229 
120 
230 
0 
0 
146 
58 
16 9 
0 
0 
0 
230 
199 
100 
46 0 
0 
0 
23 0 
16 0 
300 
0 
0 
0 
46 0 
3 7 0  
200 
310 
3 S O  
3 1 0  
so 
27 0 
so 
1 2S 
3 25 
125 
so 
21 0 
so 
4SO 
41S 
240 
16 0 
2S7 
16 0 
330 
28 7 
190 
0 
1 6 0  
0 
146 
S B  
2 08 
0 
0 
0 
16 0 
248 
16 0 
0 
3 2 0  
0 
230 
16 0 
300 
0 
0 
0 
32 0 
430 
3 2 0  
4SO 
41S 
240 
240 
36 S 
240 
37S 
4SO 
37 S 
240 
317 
240 
31 0 
3 5 0  
3 10 
300 
2S7 
16 0 
1 9 0  
287 
190 
0 
0 
3 00 
1 01 
4 9  
2 08 
0 
0 
0 
3 00 
248 
16 0 
0 
0 
6 00 
230 
16 0 
3 00 
0 
0 
0 
6 00 
4 30 
320 
S 9 0 
41S 
31 0 
490 
36 S 
240 
S2S 
4SO 
37 S 
4 9 0  
317 
240 
S 9 0  
41S 
3 1 0  
Tvpo of T rad er Pu rchat ing As1ots 
No 
Infor11atlon 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
III 
I 
II 
III 
I 
Dlv ora o Inform a t ion 
about tho State 
1 y 
II 
l(not y ) 
II(not z)  
II 
I(not z )  
IHnot y )  
II 
I 
Hnot x) 
Hnot 1) 
I 
I ( not 1) 
I ( not 1) 
III 
I 
l(not x) 
Hnot 1) 
I 
Hnot x) 
Hnot 1) 
I 
II(not z) Il(not z) !Hnot y) 
III( not z) III( not z) Ill(not 1) 
I(not y) l(not 1) l(not x) 
no prodletion1 about a lloca tions 
I 
I 
III 
II 
III 
I 
II 
III 
I 
II 
l(not y) 
III 
II 
II 
III(not z )  
l(not y )  
III I 
l(not 1) l(not 1) 
IIl(not 1) llI(not 1) 
III 
Il(not z)  
III 
Hnot 1) 
I 
Il(not y) 
Ill( not z) 
I 
no pro diotlon abou t allooatlon1 
I 
I 
III 
III 
III 
III 
II 
l(not y )  
III 
III 
IIl( not y ) 
IIl( not y )  
III I 
l(not x) l(not x) 
llI(not 1) llI(not x )  
I I  I 
l(no t z) l(not x )  
I ( n o t  z) III(not y)
<-----------a l l ( no t r a d e ) ----�·-�> 
all ( no t r a d o )  not y not 1 not z 
<--al l ( no t r ad e ) --> not x not x 
<---------all( no t r a d e )  
all(no t r a d e )  not y not x 
(--1 l l( no t r ad e ) �-) not z 
-----> 
not z 
not z 
<------------all ( no t r a d o ) ---�-�---> 
all ( no t r a d e )  not y not z not x 
<--al l ( no t r a d e ) --> not z not 1 
Ill 
III 
III 
II III I 
l(not y) IIl( not z) I(not y ) 
I(not y) lll( not z) III(not 1) 
11 a 
two securiti e s . 2 In marke t 7 ,  with a l l  trade s h av ing i dentical 
div idends , RE impl i e s  x,  y, and z pri c e s  of  5 0 ,  240 , and 490 
respectively and no trading, l e aving f inal allocations o f  s ecuri t i e s  
the same a s  the i ni ti al al locations . 
III.2 Prior Informat ion (Pl) 
12 
The pr ior inform a t i on model i s  based on three principl e s  of 
individual a c t i on .  The f irst is that traders apply B ay e s  l aw to the 
probl em of a sc e r t a i ning the l ikel ihood of  a state af ter having 
rece ived their private pri or information. The se cond p r i nc ipl e i s  
that trade r s  a c t  o n  the probabil i ty so derived. The third princ ipl e 
i s  that a c t i ons a r e  taken i n  a ccord w i th the expected u t i l i ty 
hypothesi s .  ( Here w e  make a further and s t ronger a s sumpt i on that 
traders are r i s k  neutral . )  The l aw of supply and demand i s  then 
appl ied.  Aside f rom the parametric  s t ructure the model is that 
developed by Lintner ( 1969) and appl ied to the U . S .  se cur i t i e s  m arke t .  
For our exper iment a l  marke t s  these axiom s  imply that t h e  pr ice 
of an a ss e t  will b e  equal to the expected value of the trader whose 
pr ior inform a t i on about the state l eads t o  the h i gh e st expected  value 
across a l l  trader s .  The model predi ct s that the se high e s t  exp e ct ed 
value traders  wil l hold a l l  of the s e curiti e s .  These pr edi ctions for 
each period a nd e ach state are l i sted in Tabl e 2 on rows l abel ed PI . 
III.3  Maximin (MM) 
The maximin model repl ace s the hypoth e si s r e ga rding 
expe cta t i ons form a t i on of (Pl)  with the hypothe s i s  that traders a ct 
only on certa inty . 3 Thi s  means that trade r s  w i l l  not purch a se a 
secur i ty unl e s s  the pr i ce i s  below the mi nimum ( s ) he coul d poss ibly 
receive given ( her ) his prior information. Thus the tra der wi th the 
maximum ( a cross a l l  tra de r s )  of minimum ( a cross a l l  state s )  div idend 
w i l l  purch a se the se curi ty and the compe t i tive marke t hypoth e s i s  
impl i e s  that the pri ce w i l l  be a t  thi s  dividend value .  In m arket 1 ,  
for exampl e, i f  the state i s  x ,  the model predi c t s  a price o f  90 
franc s .  Type II trade r s  who know the sta te is not z know that they 
will  re ceive at l ea st 90 francs in dividends . Since the minimum 
dividend of a l l  other i nvestors i s  l ower,  th e s e  tra der s have the 
maximum of such m inimi z er s  and w i l l ,  a ccording to the mode l ,  be the 
hol der s of all s e cur i t i e s .  The predi c t i ons for other marke t s  and 
s t a t e s  are l i sted  in Tabl e 2 on rows l abel ed MM. 
IV. RESULTS 
13 
Pri c e s  o f  the compl eted t r ansa c t i ons i n  the e l ev en 
experiment a l  marke t s  are  pl otted chrono l ogi ca l ly' in Fi gur e s  1 through 
11 . Compl ete data are given in Appendix 2 and 3 ,  Hori z onta l  l ine s i n  
these figur e s  ind i ca t e  the predi ct i ons of  the three mode l s  described 
above which can be  compa red t o  th e actua l  re sul t s .  Average 
trans a ct i on pr i c e s are a l so shown for each period. 
The conc lusions deve l oped precisely below can be seen i n  the 
data present e d  i n  the f i gur e s .  Ma rket behavior rel ative to the 
predi ctions of  the three mode l s  differs sub s t a nt i a l ly depending upon 
treatment vari abl e s ,  Th e behavior s of  the singl e s e curi ty marke t s  
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1 4  
with diverse pref er ence s ( se r i e s  A )  are  only pa r t i a l ly captured by the 
r a t i onal expectations model , The best exampl e i s  m arke t 10 in Fi gure 
1 0 , The early period p r i ce s  are cl ose to the MM pr edi ctions . Price s 
drift upw a rd a nd r emain about the same regardl e s s  of the s t a t e .  If 
the marke t s  are  compl ete cont ingent cl aims marke t s  a s  i n  ser i e s  B or 
if prefer enc e s  a r e  ide nt i ca l  ( se r i e s  C) , the r a t i onal exp e c t a t ions 
model prov ide s a rea sonably a ccura t e  summary of marke t  behavior s ,  
Ma rke t 4-CC in Figure 4 i s  one of the two cont i ngent cl aims m arke t s .  
Not i ce tha t  after tho ini tial  period or two t h e  marke t  corre sponding 
to the real i z ed s t a t e  i s  near the RE pri ce and the other two " not­
sta t e" marke t s  have pri ce s near z ero, With uniform div idend, marke t 7 
i s  s l ow e r  to a tt a i n  RE pri ce s  but by period 11 they are being a ttaine d  
a n d  in the other two uniform dividend marke t s ,  8 and 9 ,  the R E  l evel s 
a re atta ined very qui ckly.  
The di scus s ion of resul t s  is  divided into six s ub s e c t ions , 
Sub s e ct i on IV.1 cont a i ns ana ly s i s  r e l a tive to the equi l ibrium 
predi c t i ons of the three  compe ting mode l s ,  Al l mode l s  predict pri ce s, 
a l loca tions,  and p rofit s .  Subsection IV, 2  addr e s s e s  the c e ntral  is sue 
of inform a t i on a g gregati on a s  r efl ected in marke t effici ency , In a 
thi rd subs e c t i on, IV, 3 , th e dynam ics of the po s s ibl e equi l ibrating 
proc e s s  rece ive some a ttent i on a nd IV . 4  extends the inve s t i g a tion of 
dynam i c s  to th e b i ds a nd offers in the cont ingent cl aims marke t s .  
Subs e c t i on IV. 5 ana ly z e s  the data relat ive t o  the f a i r  game hypothe s i s  
o f  secur i ty marke t s ,  The s ixth subsection, IV. 6 ,  addr e s s e s  the
po s s ibl e effects of many vari abl e s  which changed a cross the marke t s ,  
1 5  
Though the s e  vari abl e s  are  not central t o  t h e  maj or the s i s  o f  thi s  
study, w e  analy z e  them i n  search for insti tut i onal vari abl e s  that may 
a s s i st in a ggrega t i on of information, We h ave l abel ed as conj ectur e s  
those re sul t s  which are e i th er sugge s t ed b y  th e d a t a  o r  are  b a s e d  o n  
very l it t l e  data . In e i ther c a s e  more data are needed for t e s t i ng 
th ese conj ectur e s ,  
IV,1 Equilibr ium Behavior 
Only the l a st occurrence of each of the thre e  s t a t e s  in e ach 
experiment a l  marke t  i s  us e d  to evalua t e  the po s s ibl e equil ibrium 
behavior , Earl ier experiment s  h ave demonstrated that r epl i c a t ion of 
peri ods i s  ne c e s sa ry for the data to approa ch the l evel s pr edi cted  by 
equi l ibrium mode l s  but no convent i on h a s  been e st abl i sh e d  for the 
number of such repl ica tions that are  nec e s s a ry and in m any c a s e s  i t  
l ooks a s  though some a dj ustment a lways o ccur s ,  I n  the s i ngl e security 
marke t s ,  e a ch s t a t e  occurs more than three time s before the 
mea surement i s  us e d  for analy s i s  in th i s  s e c t i on, Natur a l ly the 
que stion a bout i nc r e a se d model a c curacy upon even mor e r epl ica tions 
remains open. 
Conc lus ion 1 (Pr ice Leve l ) .  In s i ngl e se cur i ty marke t s  w ith diver se 
preferenc e s  ( se r i e s  A)  the pr i c e  pr edict i ons of the rat i ona l 
expectations model do not perform w e l l  rel ative to the perform ance of 
the price predi c t i ons of PI or MM. Nei ther PI nor MM i s  d i st i ngui shed 
a s  an over a l l  "best mode l , "  
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Tabl e 3 prov ide s the supporting s t a t i s t i c s ,  Three m e a surement 
criter i a  are pre sented,  For series  A the mean absolut e dev i a t i ons of 
actual pri c e s  f rom the pr ice predi ctions of  the PI model are l e s s  than 
those for e i ther of the other model s ,  The RE model i s  s i gni f i cant ly 
wor se than Pl on this c r i t erion s i nce i ts pr e di c t i ons h av e  a l ower 
mean absolut e  dev i a t i on than Pl in only one of the e i ght rel evant 
experiment s and the predi ctions of  the RE model are margina l ly wor se 
than MM, If l og o dds are used, RE i s  s i gni f icant ly wor se than both PI 
and MM s i nce the data are never the most l ikely under RE, The third 
mea sure i s  the percent of price change s in the di rection of the 
predi c t e d  p r i ce , With thi s  measure MM i s  s igni f icantly wor se than RE 
whil e  PI i s  margina l ly better than RE, In summary, RE i s  
s i gnificant ly wor s e  than PI on two c r i t e r i a  and m a rg i na l ly wor se on 
one , and h a s  mixed r e sul t s  w i th respect to MM. 
Conc lus ion 2 (Pri c e  Leve l) , In marke t s  w i th a compl e te set of state 
cont i ngent s e cur i t i e s  ( se r i e s  B)  and i n  marke t s  w ith a s i ng l e  secur i ty 
with uni f orm div i dends ( se r i e s  C) the RE model pr i ce pr edi ctions 
outperf orm both PI and MM. Fur thermor e the RE model is more a c curate 
in seri e s  B and C than it is in  series  A. 
Aga in, Tabl e 3 contains  the rel evant measur e s ,  In t h e  l a st 
periods of  the cont i ngent c l a ims marke t s  ( se r i e s  B) and in the l a st 
periods of  the uni f orm div idends marke t s  ( s e r i e s  C )  the price 
predi c t i ons of  the RE model are s i gnif icantly better than both PI and 
MM on two criter i a  (mean absolut e  dev i a t i on of  pr i ce and log odds)  and 
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marg i na l ly better on the th ird cri ter i on (percent of converging price 
chang e s ) , The RE model i s  unambiguously the be st , 
The se cond p a rt of the conclus i on e st abl i sh e s  the a c cur acy of 
the RE model in a sort of abs o l ut e  sense by comparing i t s  a c curacy to 
the c a se i n  whi ch i t  was  perform ing badly rel ative to other mode l s. 
The mean absolut e dev iations f rom the RE model i n  a l l  markets in 
seri e s  B and series  C, with the except i on of marke t 5 -CC, are  l e s s  
than a l l  marke t s  i n  ser i e s  A ,  a n d  i n  5 -CC t h e  mean absolut e dev i ation 
is better than a l l  ser i e s  A m a rke t s  e xcept marke t s  1 and 2 .  Log odds 
are alway s  better in seri e s  B and seri e s  C than in ser i e s  A, Percent 
of conver gent pr i c e  change s giv e s  a l e s s  c l e a r  pi ctur e .  
Each mode l predi c t s  a f l ow o f  s e cur i t i e s  f rom some traders t o  
other s depending upon traders'  div idends a n d  t h e  pattern of  private 
i nform a t i on ,  The a l l oc a tions predi ctions of  t h e  three model s  a r e  i n  
Tabl e 2 ,  Not i ce tha t  the trade r s  predicted t o  hol d the se cur i t i e s  by 
one model sometimes have a nonempty int e r se c t i on w i th those pr edi cted  
t o  hol d by another mode l ,  On occa sion the pr edi c t i ons by one are a 
subset  of the predi c t i ons of another,  In order to avoi d some of the 
inherent probl em s a s so c i ated w ith evalua ting s uch mode l s  we chose to 
use the se cur i ty flow s  pr edicted by th e model s a s  oppo sed to the f ina l 
hol ding s  a l one , Tabl e 4 repo r t s  the rat i o :  
x 100 
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TABLE 3 :  COMPAR ISON OF ACTUAL PR ICE.'! TO PR ICES PRll DICTllD BY TllRllll MODELS AT TUB J;ND OF EACH MARKET• 
Cri teria 
Mark e t  llxperimont1 Mean Ab s o l u t e  Devi ati o n  Log Odd s under N orm a l i t y  Perco nta go of Convergent Pri c e  Chang e s  
S eri e s  Numb e r  PI RB MM Pl RB MM PI R E  MM 
1 18 S 4  8 4  - S S  -28 4 -4SS 8 2  7 1  18 
2 26 36 8 1  -SS -1 02 -3 7 3  6 9  S 7  6 2  
3 7 5  7 2  28 - 146 -8 6 - 17 so so so 
A 4 - S  S 4  6 7  3 8  -248 2  -7 48 2 -S 7 S 7  7 0  63 3 0  
5 - S  9 4  144 38 - 47 19 -4S 09 -3 44 S 7  S 7  3 7  
6 27 105 83 -251 -3 429 -6 S 2  6 1  S 4  3 7  
10 76 13 4 3 2  -117S -27 15 - 547 S7 66 4S 
11 77 114 7 9  -S U  -8S3 -16 0 S6 6 1  3 9  
Summary S t a ti stics, S e rioa A t t t t t t 
Wilcoxon Signed I I I I I I 
Rank Sum Te st T'" 3 5  27 3 1  3 1  25 33 
Lev e l  o f  Signi ficance , 008 ( PI )  ,l 2S (MM) , 03 9 ( Pl) , 03 9 ( MM) , 191(PI) ,02(RE) 
B 4-CC 8 2  13 220 -493 -33 -38S3 3 5  6 S  3 S  s-cc 159 7 1  389 -sso -7 2 - 28 01 ZS 7 S  2S 
7 13 3 27 83 - 1S3 0 -59 - 18 9  28 8 1  5 7  
c 8 186 s so -28 1  - 17 - 1016 7 9  4 6  5.j 
9 13 6 0 83 - 1  - 1  - 1  
Summary S t a tis ti cs, S eri e s  B and c t t 
Wilcoxon Signed I I I I I I 
Rank Snm Te s t  '!"" 1S 15 10 10 8 9 
Lovol of Signi ficance , 03 1  ( Rll) , 03 1( RB) , 06 2(RE) . 06 2(RE) , 188 ( RE) ,12S (RE) 
--rhe model favored by the d a ta in each paired comparis on is shown i n  parenthes es, Tho l ev e l  of signi fi ca nce i s  the pr ob abi l i ty of i ncorr ect l y  
roj ecti ng tho nu l l  hypo thesi s that both mode l s  predi ct equ a l l y  wel l .  
TABLE 4 
COMPARISON OF AC11JAL ALLOCATIONS WITH 111E ALLOCATIONS PREDICTED BY THREE MODELS 
CRITERION: PERCENT OF PREDICTED FLOW OF SECURITIES 111AT 
AC11JALLY OCCURRED AT TOE !!ND OF EACD MARKET• 
Market Experiment s 
Series 
A 
Number 
1 
2 
3 
4-S 
5-S 
6 
10 
11 
Summary Statistics for Series A 
Wil coxon Signed + 
Rank Sum Test T 
Level of Significance 
B 
c 
4-CC 
5-CC 
7 
8 
9 
Summary Sta t istics for Series B and C 
Wilcoxon Sigoed + 
Rank Sum Te s t  T 
Level of Sign! ficance 
Mode l s  
Pl RE MM 
86 42 50 
1 9  4 6  47 
28 6 7  3 9  
1 7  17 5 
-8 5 9  18 
12 42 -2 
7 21 11 
-7 10 -7 
��-
I
��' '��-
I
�� 
26 
29 
18 
0 
1 8  
22 3 3  
,109 ( RE) ,020 ( RE )  
90 
100 
No Prediction 
No Predict ion 
No Prediction 
No Prediction 
No Prediction 
48 
4 
25 
��-
I
��' '��-
I
�� 
13 9 
,048 (RE) ,lOO( RE) 
OTbe model favored by the doh In each paired comparison is shown in 
parenthese s ,  The l evel of significance ii the probability of incorrectly 
reject ing the nul l hypothesis that both models predict equally wel l ,  
1 7  b 
Where C m i s  the s e t  of traders who are  pr edicted by model m to hold
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the secur i t i e s  i n  equil ibrium, x� i s  the pr e di c t e d  hol d i ng of tr ader i 
and xi and xi are a s  def ine d  o n  page 6 with the a and t supressed.  
The measur e s  are  taken for the  f ina l oc currence of  each state.  
Conc lus ion 3 (Al loc at ion Pred ict ions) . In a l l  series,  a l l oca tions 
aggrega t e d  ov er the f inal occurrence of each state are more a ccura te ly 
model ed by the RE model than e i th er the PI or MM. The RE model i s  
more accur a t e  i n  series  B ( the R E  make s n o  pr edi ctions i n  series  C )  
than i t  i s  i n  seri e s  A .  
Only in  m arke t 1 ( s eri e s  A)  i s  t h e  pr edi ction of  t h e  R E  model 
sub s t a nt i al ly dom i na te d  by e i ther of the other two and i n  this c a se i t  
i s  domina ted by both , In m arke t 2 the RE model i s  dom inated by only 
MM and then only by 1 percent ,  and in 4-S it i s  t i ed for f irst w i th 
Pl, but i n  a l l  others  i t  i s  the b e s t .  Rank sum t e st s i nd i c a te 
s i gn i f icant ly better performance for RE than MM ( latter rej ected a t  
. 0 2 )  a nd margina l ly better than P I  ( l atter r ej ected a t  . 10 9 ) . In 
series  B the RE model a ccount s for f rom 90 percent to 100 p ercent of 
th e flow ,  Th ese pr edi ctions of  the RE mode l are so overwhelmingly 
accurate that it s e em s  s a f e  to concl ude i t s  supe rior i ty i s  not due to 
chanc e .  I n  t h e  cont i ngent cl aims m arke t s  t h e  MM model predi c t s  z ero 
pr i ce of all secur i t i e s  so trade r s  woul d be indifferent a bout 
hol dings . Conseque nt ly we indi c a t e  no predi c t i ons for the model ,  
In  series  C i n  which a l l  traders h av e  the sam e pr ef erence the 
pr i ce should equal the state  div i dend a c cortiing to the RE model a nd 
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all trade r s  shoul d be indi ffer ent between holding a nd not holding, Of 
the two r emaining mode l s  MM s e ems margina l ly be tter . If , however,  a 
sl ight trans a ct i on co st exi s t s  the RE mode l pr edi ct s z ero tr ade s ,  As 
can be seen in Figur e s  7 through 9 the volume is decrea s ing as peri ods 
r epl ica t e ,  
Predi ct i ons of  the di stribut ion o f  prof i t s  across i ndiv idual 
trade r s  for e ach mode l are obt a i ne d  by a s suming that the predi cted 
holde r s  of  secur i t i e s  buy up all  securi t i e s  a t  the predi cted 
equil ibrium pr i c e ,  Appl ied t o  the f inal occurrence of  each state  i n  
e ach experiment ,  the sums of  the squared dev i a t i ons f rom the m e a n  a r e  
i n  Tabl e S .  
Conc lus ion 4 (Profit  Distribut ion) . In a l l  s e r i e s  the RE mode l is a 
s i gnificant ly be tter predi ctor of the distribut i on of prof i t s  than 
e i ther the Pl model or the MM model , 
In every marke t exc ept 1 ,  in which the PI model was the best,  
and 10 , in which the  M M  model w a s  best,  th e error of  the RE model i s  
l e s s  than t h e  error o f  e i ther compe ti tor , In s e r i e s  B the error i s  
v ery low and i n  s e r i e s  C the error o f  the RE mode l i s  ne ar z ero, 
Orde r st a t i st i c s  appl ied t o  the ranking of mode l s  c a n  be use d t o  
s i gnificant ly rej ect both P l  a n d  MM in f avor of RE, 
IV. 2  Ef ficiency and Informat ion Aggregat ion 
Eff i c i ency a s  the term is appl ied h ere is at 100 pe rcent in a 
given period if and only if the total earnings of a l l  trade rs  arc the 
TABLE 5 
CO'!PA:U�ON OF ACTUAL DISTilIBUTION OF PROFITS TO DISTilIBUTION PREDICTED DY 
Tilll TD REE MODELS, CRITERION : SQUARED SUM OF DEVIATION FROM TDE MEAN 
ACROSS INVESTORS AT TDE END OF EACD MARKET• 
( in thousands ) 
Market Experiments Mode l s  
Series Number PI RE Mii 
1 3 7  1 3 2  277 
2 140 29 125 
3 124 37 217 
A 4-S 181 6 5  76 
5-S 3 101 5 6 4  9 6 2  
6 3049 2356 2877 
10 2033 954 6 22 
1 1  1007 5 5 1  5 93 
Summary St a t is t ics for Series A t I 
W ii:��o�u!i�::: T+ I I 34 30 
Level of Significance ,012 ( RE) ,055 ( RE) 
B 4-CC 907 6 242 5-CC 2320 86 5 16 
7 387 47 340 
c 8 70 0 3 13 
9 3 28 0 333 
Summary Statistics for Series D and C t t 
Wilcoxon Signed I I 
Rank Sum Te s t  T+ 15 15 
Level of Significance , 03 1 ( RE) .03 1 ( RE) 
tlhe model favored by the d a ta in each paired comparison is shown in 
parenth e s e s ,  The l ev e l  of significance h tho probability of incorrectly 
roj ec ting tho nul l  hypo thesis that both models  predict equally wel l ,  
1 9 a  
1 9  b 
TABLE 6 :  EFFICIENCY• 
Market I Period I 
Ex)leriment I I 
Seri e s  Number I 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 1 0  1 1  1 2  13 1 4  1S 16 17 18 1 9  20 21 22 23 Mean Medi an I 
I 
1 y x z I x z z y y z z x z z x x z y y z I 
100 -100 ·100 100 I 0 100 100 7 S  1 0 0  7S 100 2S 100 100 -so -7S 100 8 7  .s 100 100 6 9  1 0 0 . 0  I 
I 
2 I y x y I x z y y x " x y z z y y y " y y z y " z I 
I 50 -87 . s  100 1 -75 100 100 100 so 12 .s 1 2 .S 87 . s  100 100 100 100 100 so 8 7 .S 8 7  . s  100 100 7 5  -37 . s  73 93 .7 I 
I 
3 I x z x I "  z z y y z z x z z " " z y y z z I 
l -8 7 .5 100 -iii .5 I 37 . s  100 100 1 2 .5 so 100 100 2S 100 100 3 7  . s  6 2 .5 100 62 .s 3 7  . s  so 100 78 6 2 .5 I 
I 
4-S I z " y z I I 
1 26 . s  26 . 7  -3 . 7 S  S S , 9 1  3 3  2 6  .6  I 
A I 
5-S " z z y z " y I I 
17 48 . s  3 3  . s  6 8 ,75 46 , 7  7 9 .1 94 .4 1 49 48 .5 I 
I 
6 " " z y z z y " y " " y z y z I 
71 -27 3 1  2S 5 4  6 S  78 6 4  7 1  -48 -SS 7S 71 97 6 S  4 6  6 S ,O 
10 x x z y z y " y " " y z y z y x 
-14 -25 21 43 -2 -2S 48 6 -2S -9 42 6 S  29 -5 4 -8 7 1  4 8 6 ,0 
1 1  I z " " y " z y " z y " z " I 
1 3 7  .5 -3 46 -{;6 -17 7 4  -52 -2 100 -S 9 - 9  100 -47 . s  I 18 -3 .0 
4-CC I z z z " " y " y z 
1 74 .3 96 ,3 100 88 ,8 1 0 0  100 86 . 2  88 . 7 S  100 93 96 , 3  
B 
s-cc I " z y y x " y " z 
1 26 .3 8 1 .6 100 7 6 ,2 100 100 100 100 100 8 7  100 , 0  
7 
c 8 Ef f i c i ency of uni form div i dend marke ts i s  undef ine d ,  
9 
•Eff i c i e ncy = Actual Divigeuds Paid - Z e ro-Trade Divid�uds RE Div i dends - Zero-Trade Dividends 
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maximum po s s ibl e given the pa rticul ar sta t e s  that occurred in that 
peri od ,  For exampl e, in m arke t 3 ,  all secur i t i e s  shoul d be held by 
type II traders during periods in which the state  was  x b e cause during 
these periods, type II traders receive l a rger div ide nds than type I, 
As an e xampl e of cont ingent cl aims marke t s ,  cons i de r  marke t  4-CC, 
During periods when, say, state y occurred,  type III traders shoul d 
hol d the y secur i t i e s ,  In this way the total earni ng over all traders 
is m aximiz e d ,  For conveni ence the measur e  is trunca ted at no-tr ade 
e arni ngs , That i s, ef fici ency is z ero if  div ide nds paid  equa l s  the 
payment that woul d occur if  no trade s t ook pl ace , 
Eff ici enc i e s  are  pre sented in Tab l e  6 ,  Perhaps the most 
importa nt f e a tur e s  of the e f f ici ency data are  summari z ed by the 
fol l 0?.' 1 ng conc l us i on, 
Conc lus ion 5 ,  Ef f ici enc i e s  i n  the singl e se curi ty marke t are l ow 
rel a tive to the non-diverse information e xperiment s (Plott and Sunder 
1 982 ) a nd rel ativ e  to the cont ingent cl aims marke t s ,  
Parametri c a l ly the se marke t s  a r e  simil ar t o  those studi ed by 
Plott and Sunder ( 1982 ) , The maj or differ ence i s  that in the 1 98 2  
study information a ggrega tion was  not nece s s a ry a s  t h e  st a te w a s  known 
w i th ce rta i nty by some trader s ,  Af ter a f ew periods those marke t s  
operated a t  n e a r  1 0 0  percent effici ency for a l l  sta t e s ,  On t h e  other 
hand the e f f i c i ency of series  A marke t s  aver a g e s  only 47 percent , 
Int er e s t ingly enough, the effici ency of si ngl e secur i ty marke ts i s  
l ower ( marke ts 4 -S, 5 -S, 10 , 11) when the experi ence of tra der s i s  
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g r e a t e r ,  Series  B marke t s, with a compl ete set of cont ingent cl a ims, 
hav e subs t a nt i a l ly hi gher ( a round 90 percent )  e f f i c i ency l evel s ,  
Di f f erent model s sometimes predict differ ent l evel s of 
e f f ici ency so e f f ici ency can be used as a measur e  of model ac curacy , 
Tabl e 7 cont a i ns the mean squa re errors for a l l  mode l s  in a l l  marke t s .  
Only seri e s  A i s  us e f ul because for series  B PI and RE h av e  i de nt i cal 
pr e di c t i ons whi l e  MM make s no predi c t i ons , 
Conc lus ion 6 ,  The rationa l expectations mode l i s  the l ea st a ccurate 
pr e di ctor for the eff ici ency of s e r i e s  A marke t s .  
The rank t e st l ea ds di rectly t o  a rej ect i on o f  the RE model 
when compa red to e i th er Pl or MM. 
We hav e  no measure of the degr e e  to which inform ation w a s  
suc c e ssful ly aggrega t ed i n  these marke t s ,  However,  information 
a ggrega t i on i s  rel ated to e f f ici ency even though the p r e c i s e  
r e l ationships i s  unc l e a r ,  If information i s  perf ectly aggregated,  
then an appl ication of  supply and demand sugge st s that the marke t s  
shoul d ope r a t e  a t  1 0 0  percent e f f i c i ency , Those trade r s  who h av e  the 
h i ghest div idends shoul d acquire the security ,  If no i nformation 
a ggregation t a ke s  pl ace,  then r e source s should be a l loc a te d  a ccording 
to the prior information model in which each trader i s  r i s k  neut r al 
and act s on priv ate ly received i nformation al one , 
Conc lus ion 7 .  Information a ggrega tion occurred i n  a l l  marke t s  i n  
whi ch th e mea surement c a n  be m ade, exc ept one , Furthermore,  
aggregation improv ed w i th repl ication of periods , 
TABLI! 7 
ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE B EJ.11EEN nrn EFFICIENcY PRl!DICTED BY EACB MODEL 
AND TUE OBSERVED EFFICIENcY AT TUE END OF EACB MARKET• 
Market Experiments Mode l s  
Series Number PI RE Mii 
1 9 S B  SB 
2 46 21 21 
3 2S 42 42 
A 4-S 74 74 22 
s-s 14 27 24 
6 1 9  6 4  1 0  
1 0  3 3  78 4 
11 6 1  106 32 
Summary Statistics for Series A t t 
Wilcoxon Signed I I 
Rank Snm Test T+ 25 15 
Level Of Significance ,03 9 (PI) ,03 1 (ml) 
B 4-CC 8 8 s-cc 0 0 
7 Efficiency of nniform dividend c 8 
9 marke t s  is undefined. 
itThe model favored by the data in each paired comparison is shown 
in parenthese s ,  The l evel of significance is the probabil ity of 
inco rrectly rej ecting the null hypo thesis that both model s predict 
equally wel l ,  
21 a 
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The data are  in Tabl e 8 ,  Of the f i f ty-two periods in which 
the mea surement can be m ade, a l l  were po s i tive except four , Three of 
the four peri ods of  ne ga tive aggregat i on occurred in marke t 11 in 
which aggrega tion never occurred.  A t e st on the change s in the 
aggrega tion i ndex i ndi c a t e s  that twenty out of thirty-two change s in 
a ggrega tion index upon repe t i t i on of a state  w ithin the same ·marke t  
converged t ow ards 100 percent , The probabi l i ty of chance i s  0 ,1 07 , 
Unfortuna t e ly thi s  aggregation mea sure cannot be app l ied to 
e i th er ser i e s  B or seri e s  C becaus e  those who woul d hol d the 
se curi t i e s  on the ba s i s  of  priv ate information form a sub s e t  of those 
who woul d hol d after  ful l a ggr egation,  The pr i ce behav ior in the 
series  B and C marke t s  sugge st s that the i nformation in both seri e s  
w a s  a lmost perfectly aggrega ted,  Otherw i se ,  without aggregation, 
pri ce woul d not hav e been so c l ose to the rationa l expectations 
pr ice s ,  Nev erthel e s s , given our definitions a nd pa rameters,  we are 
unabl e to provide an e l egant demonstration of the degree of 
aggregation under the al terna tiv e inst i tut i onal regimes ,  
IV. 3 Ini t i a l  Period s :  Some Price Dynamics  
Because  l earning is  an important f ea ture of expe riment a l  
marke t s  in gene r a l ,  it i s  po s s ibl e t h a t  i n  t h e s e  m arke t s  t o o  the 
behav ior of ea rly periods is di st inct f rom the behav ior of l ater 
peri ods , Tab l e  9 cont a ins the mea sur e s  of pr i ce pr edict i on a c curacy 
for the f irst peri ods a t  which a state  occurred for al l exp e riment s ,  
Jn the se r i e s  A singl e se cur i ty marke t s ,  wiih div erse pref erenc e s, the 
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TABLE 8 :  AGGREGATION INDEX• 
I Ma rket I Period 
I Exvoriment I 
I seri e s  Number I 2 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 1 2  13 14 
1 x z y y x z 
6 9  93 100 7 7  
2 x y y x x x y y 
4 100 100 73 52 5 2 90 100 
x z y y x z x 
81 76 86 77 81 
4-S I z x y 
I - 56 -15 
A 
s-s x z z y 
3 0  6 5  
6 x x y y x y x x y y 
44 83 78 8 1  98 
10 x x z y y x y x x y y 
1S 7 3 0  1 9  5 7  
1 1  x x y x y x y x .l 
-24 -13 -1 9 
4A 
B Aggrega t i on Index i s  und e f i ne d  for compl e t e  marke t s  
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7 
c 8 Aggrega t i on Index i s  unde f ined for unif orm div idend m a r ke t s  
•A g g  re ga t i  on Index � --�_,_A,,c"'t_,,u,,_a .._l __,D""'i'-'v'-'i"'d_,,_e,,_nd,,_s,,__,P_,a"'i_,,d_---'D"'i'-'v'-"'i"'d"'e,,_n,,_d �s __,u�n"'d"'e"'r�P.._I __,A�l'°"l"'o�c_,,a�t .._i o�n�-­Di v i  de nd s under RE Al l o c a t i on - Div idends under PI Al l oca t i o n  
1 5  1 6  
x x 
5 4  46 
y y 
100 100 
x 
88 
x y 
8 7  94 
z 
y 
I Convergent 
I Change 1 
17 18 1 9  20 21 22 23 I Moan Median W i th i n  S t a t e
z y y I 
97 100 I 87 3 out of 5 
I 
x y y z y x z I 
7 3  90 90 100 86 - I 90 5 out of 8 
I 
y y z I 
90 83 I 82 4 out of 6 
I 
20 
76 2 out of 2 
81 3 out of 4 
x 
2 9  2 4  2 o u t  of S 
-1 9 1 out of 2 
20 out of 3 2  
a a 0 , 107 
Note t h a t  the Aggr ega tion Index is  undef ined whenev e r  RE and Pl a l l oc a t i ons a re i de n t i ca l .  Th i s  i s  a l way s the c a s e  for tho un i f orm d i v i dends and cont ingent 
cl a i m s  marke t s  a nd is t r ue for a t  l ea s t  one o f  the thxee sta t e s  in the other m a r ke t s .  
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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TABLE 9 :  COMPARISON OF ACTUAL PRICES TO PRICES PREDICTED BY TUREE MODELS AT TUE B Fil INNING OF EACU MARKET• 
Cr i te r i a  
Market Experiment s Me an Absolute Dev iat ion Log Odds under Normal i ty Pe rcent a ge of Convergent Pr i ce Chango s 
Seri e s  Number PI RE MM PI Rll MM PI RE MM 
1 3 1  78 70 
2 37 63 64 -96 4 -2275 -2891 5 8  4 7  42 
3 SB 5 3  43 -687 -1215 -45 9 3 9  72 61 
A 4-S 5 2  6 5  40 -1646 -4901 -56 98 7 0  63 30 
s-s 9 9  1 4 9  3 5  -183 93 -675 -5 9 48 48 91 
6 75 13 4 3 2  -1118 -5040 -3 3 5  5 6  so "7 
10 164 220 5 7  -2258 -3 510 -323 8 8  88 88 
11 103 1 5 9  4 7  -2997 -5249 -1235 66 6 5  60 
SW11111 ary Sta t i st i c s ,  Seri e s  A t t t t t t 
W i l coxon S igned + I I I I I I 
Rank SUlll Te st T 3 5  3 5  21 23 16 21 
Lev el of S i g n i f i c a nce . 008 ( P I )  .008 (MM) , 148 (PI ) .078 (MM) .406 ( P I )  . 1 48 ( RE) 
B 4-CC 5 3  6 3  168 -372 -S6 -1046 48 7 9  3 4  s -cc 93 197 26 5 -88 -240 -41 2 42 7 5  5 4  
7 84 1 28 7 9  -281 -424 -33 5  6 2  5 9  so 
c 8 1 0 9  10 5 2  -1403 -25 -129 53 5 9  48 
9 109 32 94 -15 7 1  -136 -1 5 5  3 5  7 2  5 2  
Summary Sta t i st i c s ,  S e r i e s  B and C t t t t t t 
W i l coxon S igned + I I I I I I 
Rank SUlll Te st T 8 13 12 13 14 lS 
Lev el of S i g n i f i c a nce 0 . s  . 0 94 ( RE) .156 ( RE) . 0 94 ( RE) .06 2 ( RE) .03 1 ( RE) 
�he model favored by th e data in e a ch pai red compa ri son i s  shown in parenth e s e s .  Th o  l evel of s i gni f i c a nce i s  the proba bil i ty of incorrectly 
rej ect ins the nul l hypoth e s i s  t h a t  both mode l s  predi c t  equ a l ly wel 1 .
RE model is wor se than e i ther of the oth er two ,  The PI model i s  
margina l ly better than the other two a t  the beginning, 
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An exam ina t i on of  the improvement of  a model b e tween the f irst 
periods and the l ast periods indicates that the RE model shows the 
greatest improvement in seri e s  A ,  Thus a not impl aus ibl e model such 
as the one sugge sted  by Jordan ( forthcom ing ) has the marke t s  adj ust ing 
f rom a temporary PI equi l ibrium to an RE equil ibrium af ter some 
r epl ications,  
Conj ec ture 1 ,  The m arke t s  a dj ust a l ong a Jordan p a th f rom a Pl 
equil ibrium to an RE equil ibr ium, 
The conj ectur e  suffers  f rom one obv ious f l aw ,  The marke ts we  
obs erv ed in seri e s  A did not a ch i eve an RE equi l ibr i um ,  Nev erthel e s s  
t h e  v iew tha t  t h e  m arke t s  a r e  adj ust ing th rough a dynamic p a th 
beginning w ith the PI equil ibrium seem s  t o  have some mer i t .  
Insuf fici ent data exi st in ser i e s  B and C to perform 
nonpa rametri c t e s t s  on the series  indiv idua l ly ,  I n  seri e s  B the 
average pri c e  pr ediction of the PI mode l a nd the RE model are a lmost 
equa l ly close , In series  C average pr i ce predi c t i ons o f  the MM model 
and the RE model are a lmo st equa l ly close,  The poo l ed da ta show RE to  
be a signif icant ly more accurate price  predictor on  two  criteria  ( for 
mean a bsolut e dev iation, RE and PI t i ed) , Percent of convergent price 
change s favor the RE model in both ser i e s  B and s e r i e s  C,  The f act 
that the RE model rece iv e s  compe tition f rom the other model s during 
the f irst period l ends some support to the conj ecture or at l ea st the 
spirit of the conj ecture tha t  it m i ght be useful to st udy the 
adj ustment proce s s  as though it ope rated on an equil ibrium pa th f rom 
PI towards RE. 
IV. 4  Cont ingent Cl a ims Price Dynamics  and the Rol e  of Bids
24 
In cont i ngent cl aims m arke t s  with diverse i nformation 
structure trade r s  who know, say, tha t  s t a te x h a s  not occurred, know 
not only that th e v al ue of x-cont i ngent security i s  z er o  to them, but 
they also  know that i t s  v al ue i s  z ero to a l l  those who acquire thi s  
i nform a t i on,  Making a n  offer to s e l l  a security cont i ng e nt upon the 
state  th a t  a trader know s has not occurred is a no- lo s s  propo s i t i on i f  
the trader expe c t s  the pr ice  to move toward z ero,  Buy ing a ny securi ty 
on initial information i nvolves  some ri sk, It is rea sonabl e to 
hypoth e s i z e  that the f irst m arke t a c t i on will be a n  offer ( to sell) by 
a trader who knows the secur i ty i s  worth nothing , 
Hypothe s i s  1 ,  The opening a c t i on i n  a market period i s  a n  offer to 
s e l l  a cont i nge nt cl aim corre sponding t o  one of the two s t a t e s  that 
has not occurred and is m ade by a trader who has prior i nformation 
th a t  th e corre sponding s t a t e  has not occurred, 
Under th e nul l hypo the s i s  the opening a c t i on coul d o ccur in 
a ny of the three cont ingent cl aims m arke ts,  coul d be a bid or  an 
off er, and could be made by any tr ader with the except i on that the
traders informed "not x" w i l l  not bid for x-cont ingent secur i ty and 
s imil arly for the other sta t e s ,  Thus, ther e is a two-out-of-ten or 20 
25 
percent probabil i ty that the event s i n  Hypo the s i s  1 wil l occur by 
random chance . As shown i n  Tabl e 10 , the event occurred in 1 2  of the 
18 opportun i ti e s .  The nul l hypo the s i s  i s  strongly rej ect ed i n  f avor 
of Hypoth e s i s  1 .  
If the subst ance of Hypoth e s i s  1 i s  true, then opening offers 
made i n  a cont i ngent claims marke t corre sponding t o  a sta te tha t  has 
not occurred c a n, by a proce s s  of el imina tion, inf orm hal f the traders 
which state has occurred, Such new ly informed traders wil l w i sh to 
buy the corre sponding cont i ngent secur i ty ,  Thus , the ope ning action 
i n  the cont ingent cl a ims marke t corre sponding to the real i z ed s ta t e  
shoul d b e  a bid ( t o  buy) . 
Hypothe s i s  2 :  The f irst act ion i n  the " st a te" marke t i s  a b i d  ( t o  
buy) , 
Because the f irst a c t i on can be e i th er a bid or an of fer, 
probabil ity th at the f irst a c t i on in this marke t  w i l l  be a bid by 
random chance i s  50 percent , Agai n, Tabl e 10 cont a ins the resul t s .  
The a l t erna t ive i s  r ej ected i n  f avor o f  Hypo the s i s  2 .  
Assume that state x h a s  occurred and the f irst  a c t ion i s  a n  
offer t o  s e l l  y-cont i ngent secur i ty .  I f  thi s  offer i s  interpr e ted by 
trade r s  whose priv ate information i s  " not z" to mean that the state i s  
not y e i ther,  they would know that th e state  i s  x a nd w i l l  therefore 
be incl ined to buy the x-cont i nge nt secur i ty ,  Thi s  rea soning l eads to 
th e th ird hypoth e s i s  about the behav ior of bids a nd offer s : 
TABLE 10 
All}LYSIS OF BIDS AND OFFERS IN CONTINGENT CLAIMS MARKETS 
Number of Probabil ity of 
Occurrences Occurrences under 
Hypothe s i s  Market and Sample S i z e  Nul l Hypothe s i s  a-Lev e l •  
4-CC 7 out of 9 0 .2 0 .0004 
4-CC 5 out of 9 0 .2 0 .0210 
Combi ned 12 out of 18 0 .2 0 .0000 
4-CC 8 out of 9 0 .5 0 .0200 
2 5-CC 7 out of 9 0 .5 0 .0700 
Combined 15  out of 18 0 .5 0 .0008 
4-CC 2 out of 3 0 .5 0 .5000 
5-S 3 out of 4 0 .5 0 .3 100 
Combined 5 out of 7 0 . 5  0 . 23 00 
•Probabi l i ty th a t  the real i z e d  sampl e or a more extreme r e s ul t 
" i l l  be obta ined by random chance under the nul l  hypoth e s i s .  
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Hypoth e s i s  3 :  When the f irst a c t i on i n  the " sta te" marke t  i s  preceded 
by act i on in only one of the two " not" marke t s ,  th i s  f irst act ion (a 
bid by Hypoth e s i s  2)  wil l be by a trader who se pr iva t e  information i s  
that th e state  corre sponding t o  the se cond o f  the two " not" marke t s  
h a s  not occurred, 
Because thi s  act ion could b e  taken by traders with e i th er of 
the two pi ece s of  inform a t i on a nd the numbe r  of traders w i th e ach 
pi ece of information i s  equa l ,  the cond i t i on in Hypoth e s i s  3 will  be 
ful f i l l e d  by random chance 50 percent of the time , The t e s t s  
summariz ed i n  Tabl e 10 indica te tha t  the ev i dence f avors Hypothe s i s  3 
as w e l l  a s  the f irst two hypoth e s e s ,  but i t  i s  much weaker, perhaps 
due to a much smal l er sampl e s i z e ,  
IV. 5  F a i r  Game Te s ts 
In the s ingl e secur i ty marke ts o f  series  A, the trading 
occurred at prices far from the RE equi l ibr ium pr i c e s ,  How ev er, such 
trading d i d  not offer trade r s  opportunity to make prof its by us ing 
mech ani cal  tr ading rul e s ,  Tabl e 1 1  shows the average amount of 
capital gains that coul d be obt ained in the singl e security marke ts by 
fol l ow ing f iv e  trading rul e s :  ( 1 )  buy-and-hold, ( 2 )  tr end f il ter,  ( 3 )  
1-franc f il ter,  ( 4 )  5-franc f il ter,  and ( 5 )  25-franc f il te r . 4 For the
singl e-pe r i od secur i t i e s  tr aded in these marke t s ,  equil ibr ium re turn 
ov er time i s  z ero, None of the four f il ter rul e s  is abl e to beat a 
na ive buy- and-hold strategy mor e often than i t  i s  beaten by such a 
stra tegy ,  Th ese marke t s  e r e  simil ar to the New York S tock Exchange in 
PR01'11 
Series Market 
A 1 
2 
3 
4-S 
s-s 
6 
10 
11 
Sum of Ranks 
for Series A 
B 4-CC 
s-cc 
c 7 
8 
9 
Sum of Ranks 
for Ser i e s  B and C 
Sum of Ranks 
for a l l  Marke t s  
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TABLE 1 1  
FROll MECHANICAL TRADING RULES : TESTS OF FAIR GAME UYPOTIIESIS 
Olean Prof i t s  and Rank) 
RE Price 
Buy and Trend 1-Franc S-Franc 25-Franc Perfect 
Dold Fil ter Filter Fil ter Fil tor Information 
9 .0 ( 2 )  4 .0 ( 3 )  -14 .0 (S .S ) -14.0 ( S  .S ) -3 .o ( 4 )  33 . o  ( 1 )  
2 ,8 ( 4 )  3 . o  ( 3 )  3 . s  ( 1 .S )  3 .s ( 1 .S )  -0 ,8 ( S )  -2 .s ( 6 )  
1 .0 ( 5 )  4.0 ( 4 )  s . o  ( 2 ,S ) s .o ( 2 .S )  0 ,6 ( 6) 6 .o ( 1 )  
1 0  .o ( 1 )  o .o (S . s ) 3 ,0 ( 2 .S )  3 .0 ( 2 .S )  o .o ( 5  ,S ) 1 .0 ( 4 )  
14 .9 (1) 9 , 0 ( 3 )  2 .0 ( 4 .s ) 2 .0 ( 4 ,S )  -1.0 ( 6 )  12 .0 ( 2 )  
2 5  .o ( 1 )  20 .0 ( 2 )  7 .0 ( 4 )  7 .0 ( S )  o .o ( 6 )  1 1 .0 ( 3 )  
1 6  .o ( 5 )  20 ,0 ( 4 )  2 2 .0 ( 3 )  23 .o ( 2 )  -1 .0 ( 6 )  2 4  .o (1) 
51 .0 ( 1 )  47 , 0  ( 2 )  1 5  . o  ( S  .5 ) 15 ,0 ( S  , S )  22.0 ( 4 )  4 5  .o ( 3 )  
(20 ,0) ( 26 .s) ( 2 9 ,0 )  ( 2 9 ,0)  ( 42 . 5 )  ( 21 .0) 
45 .0 ( 1 )  22 ,0 ( 3 )  -6 , 0  ( 4 .5 )  -6 ,0 ( 4 ,5 )  0 ,3 ( 6 )  44.0 ( 2 )  
101 .0 ( 2 )  24.0 ( 3 )  21 ,0 ( 4 ,S )  21 .0 ( 4 , S )  18 .o ( 6 )  118 ,0 ( 1 )  
-7 ,0 ( 2 )  -10 .0 ( 3 )  -3 8 ,0 ( 6 )  -36 .o ( S )  -35 .o ( 4 )  90 .o ( 1 )  
3 0  .o ( 1 )  8 ,0 ( 4 )  s .o (S  ,S ) s .o (S .S ) 11 .0 ( 3 )  1 6  .2 ( 2 )  
-11 .0 ( 2 )  -s1 .o ( 4 )  - ? S  .O (S .S ) -?S , 0  ( S  . s )  -49,0 ( 3 )  8 3  . o  ( 1 )  
( 8  .0) (17 ,0)  ( 26 ,0) (25 ,0)  ( 2 2 .0 )  ( 7  , 0 )  
( 2 8  ,0)  (43 . S )  ( S S  ,0) ( 5 4 .0)  ( 64 .S ) (28 .0) 
tha t  i t  i s  difficul t to di scover mechani c a l  trading rul e s  that 
sta t i st i ca l ly best the na ive buy- and-hold s t r ategy ,  I n  a ddi t i on, in 
the s i ngl e se curi ty marke t s  of seri e s  A, s rul e based  on perfect 
knowl edge of the RE equi l ibrium pr i ce in these marke t s  doe s  not best 
the na ive strategy ,  
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Marke t s  i n  seri e s  B and s eri e s  C converge to ne ar the rationa l 
expectations pr i ce s ,  Buy and hold bests  the f il ter rul e s  in seri e s  B 
and C but i t  i s  not a s  good a s  knowl edge of the RE equil ibrium pr i ce ,  
We c a n  concl ude : 
Conc lus ion 8 ,  The f a i r  game property of s e curity marke t s  i s  s 
ne c e s s a ry but not a suffici ent condi tion for the exi stence of RE 
pri c e s ,  
The c a l cul a ti ons a s sume,  o f  cour s e ,  that purch a s e s  in a c cord 
with the rul e s  appl i e d  above woul d not a f f ect price or otherw i s e  l e ad 
t o  s transm i s s i on of  the i nform a t i on, The r e sul ts given in Tabl e 11 
and the resul t s  of  f il ter t e st s on marke t data in gene r a l ,  a s sume that 
the margina l  effect of such str a t e g i e s  on the behav ior of the marke t  
i s  ne gl i gibl e ,  Thi s  a s sumpt i on i s  unl ikely t o  hold, espe ci al ly for 
perfect knowl edge of rati ona l expectations equil ibrium price because 
such know ledge can a l ter the behav ior of the marke t as was shown in 
Pl ott a nd Sunder ( 1982 ) , 
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IV, 6  <Yl'IIER VARIABLES 
S ev eral vari abl e s  were changed duri ng these exp e riment s ,  The 
f i rst f ew marke t s  of seri e s  A y ielded s ne ga tive re sul t rega rdi ng the 
abil ity of marke t s  to a ggrega te i nformation, The chang e s  in variabl e s  
in l ater marke t s  repre sent probe s i nto t h e  po ssibi l i ty tha t  some 
a spe c t s  of the structure or th e proce dure m i gh t  be r e spons ibl e . Had 
any of these changes  y i elded immedi a t e  and s trong difference s i n  
behav ior, the r e se arch woul d h av e  focus e d  i n  the indicated d i rection, 
Consequently th e discus s ion in th i s  s e c t i on repre se nt s  a n  e x  post 
exam ina t i on of  vari abl e s  that were dropped a s  hav ing s l ow probabil ity 
of being of substant i al importanc e .  
Duri ng the cour se o f  some marke t s  traders l earned t h e  a ctual 
rati onal exp e c t a ti ons pr i c e s  and/or that marke ts can a g gr ega te 
information,  Doe s such experi ence m a ke s differenc e ?  In m a rke t s  4-S, 
5 -S, 1 0 ,  and 11 subj ect s had a l l  parti cipated in s marke t  in which the 
RE inform a tion phenomenon e x i s t e d .  If marke t effici ency i s  used a s  
the mea sure of the importance of th i s  expe ri ence , the data sugge s t s  
that experi ence was n o  h e l p  s t  a l l  and i t  m ight even hur t .  The data 
are  i n  Tabl e 12 . 
Conj ecture 2 ,  Prior experi ence of traders w i th the RE phenomena i s  
not s suf f ic i ent condition for the s i ngl e se curity marke t t o  a rrive s t  
the R E  equil ibrium ,  
Trade rs  may have d i f f icu l ty dev e l oping trading rul e s  rel a tiv e 
to private  informati on, By al l ow ing t r aders to spe c i al i z e  i n  
TABLE 1 2  
rol!PARIS<l'l O F  MEAN EFFICIF.NCY OF SINGLE SECURITY, DIVERSE 
DIVIDF.ND MARlETS ( SERIES A) wrrn AND wrrnouT RE EXPERIF.NCE 
Experiment Number Moan Ef f ici ency 
1 6 9  
Without 2 73 
Experi ence 3 78 
6 46 
Rank S wn  
4-S 33 
With 5-S 49 
Experi ence 10 8 
1 1  18 
Rank S11111 
Level of Signif icance• 
•Wi l coxon Rank S11111 Test
110 : Eff iciency i s  unchanged with experience 
111 : Effici ency decreases with oxporienco 
Upper t a i l  probabil i ty given. 
Rank 
6 
7 
8 
4 
25 
3 
5 
1 
2 
1 1  
,029 
Source : My l e s  Rot lander and Dougl a s  A.  Wot fe, Nonpa rametric 
S t a t i s t i c a l  Methods, Now York: W i l ey,  1 97 2 ,  Chap, 4 ,1  and 
Tabl e A . 5 , 
28 a 
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funct i ons, w e  thought " noi se" i n  t h e  s i ngle  securi ty marke t s  m ight be 
ident i f ied and the form a ti on of RE behav ior spe eded,  With marke t  4 
th e number of inv e st or type s was  increased f rom two to th r e e .  With 
th ree type s a different set of "buy er s" occurs w i th each s t a t e  so 
giv en the state the compo s i t i on of demand and supply shoul d h av e  more 
stabil i ty .  I f  average e f f i c i ency i s  the mea sure o f  RE formation the 
r e sul t s  in Tab l e  1 3  show that e f f ici ency i s  h i gh er w i th two type s than 
w i th three .  
Con j ecture 3 .  The increase  i n  the number of trader type s d i d  not 
improve the RE form a t i on proce s s ,  
Not e that with the exception o f  marke t 6 ,  a l l  marke t s  with two 
trader type s are  those w i thout experi enced t r ade rs  and a l l  marke t s  
w i th th ree  trader type s h av e  experi enced trade r s .  Thus, i t  i s  
di f f icul t to disentangl e the effect s of th ese two treatment v a riabl es,  
number of type s and exp e r i ence , with our data , 
Of cour se if the number of type s i s  r educed t o  one type a s  in  
s e r i e s  C, the RE model works w el l ,  We suspect,  howev er, that th e key 
is not the numbe r  of type s but know l edge of pref erence s,  a s  w i l l  be 
di scus s e d  l a ter.  
The RE model depends upon the state r ev e l a tion through pr i ce 
and other observabl e marke t phenomena . If l a rger sampl e s  exi sted, the 
str ength of the s i gnal might be improved.  In order to check th i s  
po s s ibil i ty the volume w a s  increased by increa sing the endowment s o f  
a l l  trade r s  in m arke t 6 and some o f  the l a ter• marke ts,  from two uni t s  
1, I 
TABLE 13 
COllPl.r:ISOO OF MEAN EFFICIENCY 
OF SINGLE SECURITY, DIVERSE DIVIDEND MARKETS 
( SERIES A) WTI11 TWO AND THREE DIFFERelT TYPES OF INVESTORS 
Number of 
Inve st or Type 1 Market Mean Ef fici ency 
2 1 6 9  
2 2 ? 3  
2 3 ?8 
Rank Sum 
3 4-S 33 
3 s-s 49 
3 6 46 
3 10 8 
11 18 
Rank Som 
Leve l  of Sign i f icance• 
•Wil coxon Rank Sum Test
B0 : Number of investor type 1 make 1 no difference toe f f i c i ency 
Rank 
6 
? 
8 
21 
3 
5 
4 
1 
2 
1 5  
,018 
u1 : Effici ency decrease a 1 1  tho number of investor type s lncrea se s .  
Upper t a i l  probabil ity given,
Sonrc e :  My l e s  Hollander and Dougl a s  A.  Wolfe, Nonpa rame t r ic 
S t a t i stical Methods, New York: W i l ey, 19?2, Chap. 4 ,1 and 
Tabl e A , 5 , 
2 9 a  
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to  four uni t s ,  The resul t s  in Tabl e 1 4  indi c a te e f f i c i enc i e s  are  
alway s  high er i n  the l ow vol ume marke ts ,  
Conj e cture 4 .  Volume i ncrease s do not f a c i l itate RE price f ormation. 
Col l ine a r i ty of the three treatment v a ri abl e s  woul d h ave to be 
h andl ed more c areful ly ,  espe c i al ly if the effect of experience,  number 
of inv e stor type s,  and volume on e f f ici ency of these  marke t s  were 
po s i tive ,  Given t h e  ne ga tive re sul t s  our conj ectur e s  merely sugge st 
that these treatm ent v ari abl e s  are  unl ikely to be of independent 
s i gnif icanc e .  
V, WHY DO TIIE CONTINGENT CLAIMS MARKETS AGGREGATE INFORMATION BEITER? 
The t i t l e  of th i s  section s t a t e s  the ov erri ding que stion that 
has em erged f rom the r e s e a rch, Four different type s of  exp l ana tions 
have occurred to us , In this section we wil l rev iew them . 
The f irst pot ent i a l  expl ana t ion i s  that the singl e se cur i ty 
marke t s  are  s l ow to a dj ust a nd that, given more time, the s e  m a rke t s  
too w i l l  behav e a s  pr edict ed by the R E  mode l .  Indeed data exi st s that 
sugge s t s  the s ingl e secur i ty marke ts might ul timately atta i n  a 
rationa l exp e c t a t i ons equil ibr ium ,  In m arke t  3 the pr i ce i n  state  z 
seem s  to be sepa r a t i ng i n  spite of the remarkable  counter- examp l e  
prov ided by period 1 9  ( s e e  Fi gure 3 ) ,  In marke t  6 and 1 the price in 
state y appears  t o  be separating ne ar the end of  the se exp eriment s ,  
In marke t 1 1  the z state  appe ars  t o  b e  separated,  But of cour se these 
TABLB 14 
COMPARISON OF MEAN EFFICIENCY OF SINGLE SECURITY, DIVERSE 
DIVIDEND MARKETS WTI11 TWO AND FOUR SECURITIES PBR INVFSTOR 
Number of 
Securi t i e s  Market Mean Effici ency 
por Investor 
2 1 6 9  
2 2 73 
2 3 7 8  
2 4-S 3 3  
2 11 1 8  
Rank Sum 
4 s-s 4 9  
4 6 46 
4 10 8 
Rank Sum 
Level of Signi f icance• 
•Wil coion Rank Sum Test
n0 : Effici ency h unchanged whoo volume ii h igher.
n1 : Effici ency decroaso1  when volume Is h i gher.
Uppor tail probabi l i ty given.
Rank 
6 
7 
8 
3 
2 
26 
10 
. 1 96 
Source : Myl e s  Hol l ander and Dougl a s  A. Wol fe, Nonparametric 
Statis t i c a l  Methods, Now York: Wiloy, 1 9 7 2 ,  Chap, 4 ,1  and 
Table A,S , 
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s i gns that a w i l l ing ey e c a n  extract f rom the d a t a  must be cons i dered 
w i th the sevent e e n  periods of market 10  where there seem to be no 
s i gns of separat ion.  
A s e cond expl anation r e s t s  on a compari son of the " si z e" of 
the m e s s a ge spa c e ,  The m e s s a g e  space of the cont ingent c l aims marke t s  
i s  l arger than t h e  message space o f  the si ngl e s e curity marke ts in the 
sense tha t  three s e t s  of bids /of f e r s /pri c e s  are av a i l abl e to the 
traders in the form e r .  The l arger m e s s a ge spa c e ,  a ccording to thi s 
v i ew, al l ow s  trader s to e stabl i sh a one-to-one m e s s a ge- state  
corre spondenc e ,  The probl em w i th th e i dea i s  seri e s  C,  for  whi ch the 
s i z e  of the m e s s a ge spa ce w a s  ident i ca l  to that of s eri e s  A. Seri es C 
performed subs t a nt i a l ly in accord w i th the RE mode l s  where a s seri e s  A 
did not . If message  spa ce s i z e  w a s  the probl em w i th seri e s  A it 
shoul d have surfaced  a l so w i th seri e s  C.  
A third pot e nt i al expl anation i nvol ves the absence of a one-
to-one rel ationship between the state and price al ong a l l  point s a l ong 
the dynam ic p a th taken by pri ce on the w ay to a FF. equi l ibrium ,  In 
n• a r l< e t  4 for exampl e,  the two s e t s  of equi l ibrium pri ces,  PI and RE, 
are  sh own on the v er t i c a l  l ine s a l one w i th the sta t e s  that woul d 
i n duce th ose pr i c e s  ( s e e  Fi gure 12) . 
Con s i d e r  a dynam ic  mode l  th at h a s  pri c e s  adj ust ing f irst to a 
PI equi l ibrium and then moving f rom there to a RE equi l ibrium al ong 
the ind i c a t e d  l ine s ,  Now not i ce th at regardl ess  of the s t a t e  an 
instant exi s t s  in which it is impo s s ibl e for a l l  par t i c ipants to inf er 
t11 e state f rom the pr i c e ,  
y , z 2 5 7  
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Thi s  third idea suffer s o n  two count s. Fi rst, it is always 
poss ible for some subset of the traders to us e the market price and 
the i r  private i nformat i on to ident ify th e state. Secondly, from 
experini cnt 6 Ol\wnrd only th e i niti al ident ificati on problem, the one 
at the PI , equi libri nm, exi sted. The paramete r s  w ere adjusted so the 
paths did not cross. Th e remaining markets st i ll did not adj ust to 
th e RE equil ibri um. 
The fourth explanation rests with the type of informati on 
implicit in the structure of the cont ingent claims us ed in these 
markets, A security paid a pos itive d i v idend only if a state occurred 
and paid z ero otherw i s e ,  so strate gic con s i derat i on s  a si d e ,  the 
purchase or sale of a security could be d irectly interpreted a s  a 
belief about the occurrence of a particular state, Thus traders i n  
the cont ingent claims markets had a "natural" knowledge about the 
prefer ence s of other traders that was not pre sent i n  the s ingle 
security markets, 
The same type of informati on probably exi sted in the uniform 
d i v idend s eries C. If traders began w ith a pre sumption that other 
preference s are simi lar to their own, the i r  initial a ssessment of 
other s i s  correct in th e s e  m arkets. Th e knowledge ba se s of act i ons 
can then be inferred. 
Thi s idea, that one key to market performance is a knowledge 
of other s '  preference s,  is further supported by the ana ly s i s  of bids 
di scus s ed above, Traders se emed to us e the ir knowledge of other s '  
preferences in determining their own act i ol\S. The offer t o  sell the x 
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s e curi ty ,  for example,  a t  the opening of a market seemed to be 
interpreted  as a s i gnal th at the sel l er knew the state was not x. If  
for exampl e ,  the  cont ingent c l aim s were repl i• cec� by a " spanni 11g" set  
of compound s e curi t i e s  that  were not "Arrow-f.•eLreu" s e curi t i e s ,  then 
such an inference could not ne c e s s a r i ly be made .  On our bel ief about 
the behav ior of the s e  marke t s ,  informat ion woul d not become perfectly 
aggrega t e d  with such a " spanning" se t  of securi t i e s .  
Th e s e  four idea s exh aust our current thinking o n  the subj ect . 
We are of the op inion that the key to under standing the s e  marke t s  
r e st s  in part with trade r s '  bel i e f s  of  other trader s '  pref erence s .  
Some so rt o f  knowl edge of oth er s '  preference s appe a r s  t o  be a 
ne c e s sary condition for aggrega t i on of diver se  i nformat ion.  However 
our own unde rstanding of  the i s sue is so incompl ete that we cannot 
even prov ide a prec i s e  conj ectur e ,  
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The r e sul t s  h ave both po si tiv e  a11d ne ga tive el ement s .  On the 
po s i tive side, experiment s  in the cont i ngent cl aims marke t s  ( s eri e s  E )  
and i n  the u11iform div idends m arke t s  ( s eri e s  C )  demonst rate that 
marke t s  can a ggregate diverse  i 11form ation in a manner consi stent with 
rationa l expe�t a t i ons model s .  The marke t s  in seri e s  B and in seri e s  C 
are perhaps the very first demonst rat ion that marke t s  cau  
simul tane ous ly perform the independent funct ions of  information 
aggrega t i on, information di s s emination a nd conf l i c t  r e so l ut ion, 
The ne gative resul t s  are of two form s ,  Fi r st,  as  demons trated 
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b y  the marke t s  in seri e s  A ,  not a l l  marke t s  can be  depended upon to 
beh ave in a ccord w i th the rational exp e ctat ions model . The se cond 
ne gative r e sul t is that f air  gam e test s us e d  to check for effi c i ent 
market behavior are unr e l i alol e incl i c a tors about when a m a r ke t  i s  not 
operati11g e f f i c i ently . Eveu tlwu ch Ho e tr, arke ts  i n  seri e s  A were not 
operating e f f i c i ently in the rati onal expe c t a t i ons sense they were 
st i l l  " fa i r  gam e s . "  That i s, fil ter rul e s  for potent i a l ly prof itable 
trade s worked no better than " buy and hol d . "  Marke t s  that are " fair 
gam e s" are not 11e ce s s ar i ly effi c i ent . 
A contpa ri son of the s i ngl e security marke t s  i n  seri e s  A with 
the cont i ngent c l aim s  marke t s  o f  seri e s  B that had sub s t a nt i a l ly the 
same econom i c  p aramete r s  demonstrate s the importance of marke t  
institut ions a nd instrument s ,  The introduct ion o f  a compl ete s e t  of 
Arrow-Debr cu s e curi t i e s  tr ansformed a mar ke t  that w a s  operat ing 
ine f fici ent ly into a market th at rapi dly ach i eved a rational 
expectations equi l ibrium .  
Exa ctly why the cont ingent c l aim s inst rum ent s produced s uch a 
dramatic effect i s  an open que s t i on,  S eri e s  C demonstrate s that a 
single  securi ty will  perform according to the RE mode l if a l l  trade r s  
h ave simi l ar preference s .  A n  analy s i s  of  th e b i d s  in t h e  cont ingent 
cl aims marke t s  sugge st s that traders used impl i c i t  inform ation about 
otl1 er s '  pre f erence s .  TI· e se two seri e s  together sugg e st that some 
know l edge about oth er trade r s '  preference s may be a ne ce s s a ry 
condi tion for th e operat ion of rat iona l exp e c t a t i ons princ ipl e s  i n  
marke t s ,  
APPENDIX 1 
Marke t s  were conducted in four steps : ( 1 )  training w i th the 
mechani sm used  to draw state s of  na ture;  ( 2 )  t r aining with the 
mechani sm to di stribute diver s e  information; ( 3 )  e xpl anation of 
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procedures a n d  rul e s  of the market; ( 4 )  conduct o f  marke t s  f o r  several 
periods . 
STEP 1 :  TRAINING WITH MECHANISMS USED TO DRAW TIIE STATES OF NATURE 
Instruc t i on S e t  1 wa s di stri buted and read al oud. On the 
tabl e between the subj ect s and the experim ent e r s  was kept a bingo c a ge 
w i th the appropriate  number of bal l s .  Subj ect s had the opportunity to 
observe the ope r a t i ons of  the device s for many draw s .  Fol l ow ing thi s ,  
subj ect s w e r e  a s ked t o  predict t h e  out come,  with the incent ive 
st ructure de scribed in the instruct i ons , for about 10-20 d raws unt i l  
mos t ,  though not a l l ,  subj ects  predicted t h e  s t a t e  with the h i ghest  
rel ative f requency based on the bingo-ca g e  number s .  No ment i on was  
made of probabil i t i e s .  
Ins truc t i on S e t  1 [ S ta te Probabi l i ty Training ] 
Each year we draw a ba l l  from a bingo cage cont a ining thirty-
six b a l l s  numbe r  one through thi rty- six.  If the  bal l drawn i s  
numbered one through twelve, outcome o f  the draw i s  ca l l ed x ;  i f  the 
bal l drawn i s  numbered thirteen through twenty- four, the out come is y ;  
i f  the ba l l  drawn i s  numbered twenty- fiv e  through thirty- s ix, the 
outcome i s  z . 5 
You h ave to predict the outcome of each draw before i t  i s  
announced.  If your predict i on is correc t ,  you win $0 .2 5 ;  if  wrong, 
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you l o s e  $0 .10 . Before t h e  f irst draw i s  made , record your predict ion 
by ci rcl ing e i ther x, y, or z in the f irst row of the enc l o s e d  she e t .  
After y o u  have encircled  o ne l etter,  the outcome w i l l  be a nnounced a nd 
you shoul d record the announced outcome in the bl ank space on the same 
row of the tabl e .  If your predict ion i s  correct, c i rcl e the amount 
shown in the Win column, otherw i s e  c i rcl e the amount shown i n  the Lo s e  
column. 
Once you have r ecorded your predi c t i on you must not m a ke a 
change ;  any era sure wil l inval ida te your pr ediction.  At the end, add 
up your total winnings a nd l o s s e s  and record the difference (net  
w innings or l o s s e s )  a t  the bottom ri ght corner of the she e t  [ s e e  
Fi gure 13 ] .  
STEP 2 :  TRAINING WITH MECHANISM TO DISTRffiUTE DIVERSE INFORMATION 
Instruc t i on s e t  2 wa s d i s t ribut ed a nd read a l oud. Fol l ow ing 
the above procedures,  the exp erimenter drew a bal l from the bingo 
cage,  recorded the s t a t e  drawn, consul ted the m a st e r  c l ue sh eet,  and 
c a l l ed out the row and column numbers of  the c e l l  on the subj ect s '  
clue sh eet that cont a ined e a ch subj ect ' s c l ue .  
In advance of the exp erim ent , a compl e t e  l i st  of a l l  pos s ibl e 
way s  of div iding a group o f  an ev en number of inv e stors i nto two equa l 
groups ( for n = 1 2 ,  thi s  number i s  n l  = 462)  was prepared.  
2 [ (n/2)  I 1 2 
Th e se combina t i ons were randomly ordered.  One combination beginning 
f rom the top of thi s l i st was  us ed e a ch period t o  distr ibute 
Number 
1 
2 
Circle One 
Dec i s ion 
x 
x 
y 
y 
z 
z 
PREDICTION SHEET 
Ou tcome 
x , y, or z 
Win 
($ )  
0 . 25 
0 . 25 
To tal winnings 
Total losses 
3Ga 
Subj ect No . 
Circle One 
Lose 
($ )  
-0 . 10 
-0 . 10 
Net winnings/losses �����-
FIGURE 1 3  
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information among the inve stors a nd none were repeated  because the 
number of peri ods in any one experim ent never exc e eded 23 , A coin 
toss  determined whi ch group received information about whi ch of the 
two unrea l iz ed s t a t e s ,  A separate clue shee t  wa s de s i gned for each 
i nv e stor [ s e e  Fi gure 1 4 )  a l ong w i th a master clue shee t  for the 
experiment e r , After de term ining the rea l iz ed s t a t e ,  the exp eriment e r  
c a l l ed o u t  t h e  row and c olumn number o f  the clue sheet which cont a i ne d  
the priv ate i nform a t i on o f  each investor.  Thi s  method provided quick 
but conf i dent i a l  yet  open means of  communicat ing diver se  i nformation 
to a l l  market part i c ipant s ,  
Trai ning w ith thi s  clue sheet w a s  cont inued for e i gh t  t o  ten 
draws unt i l  all subj ect s were famil iar with the mechani sm, 
Instruct ion Set  2 [S t a te and Clue Tr aining] 
At the beginning of  each year,  the experiment e r  w i l l  prov ide 
you with a c l ue about whether x, y, or z div idend w i l l  be paid  e a ch 
period. After the experim enter h a s  turned the bingo c a ge· and 
de term ine d the dividend out come for the peri od, he wil l announce a row 
and column number of a c e l l  on your clue sheet which w i l l  cont a i n  one 
of the fol l ow ing : 
( i) not x 
( i i )  not y 
( i i i )  not z 
If the c e l l  on your clue sheet cont a ins "not x, " the div i dend paid  for 
th at period w i l l  not be x .  Simil arly, "not y" and "not z" inform you 
that the div idend paid  w i l l  not be y and w i l l  not be z respe c t ively.  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
1 2  
1 3  
1 4  
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
2 1  
2 2  
2 3  
24 
2 5  
2 6  
2 7  
2 8  
2 9  
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
1 
not y 
nox x 
no t y 
no t y 
not z 
n o t  z 
n o t  x 
no t y 
not x 
no t z 
not z 
no t y 
n o t  y 
not z 
not y 
no t x 
not y 
no t y 
no t z 
not y 
not z 
n o t  y 
not x 
not z 
not y 
n o t  x 
not z 
no t z 
not z 
no t x 
no t z 
not z 
n o t  y 
no t z 
not z 
2 
no t x 
not y 
no t y 
no t y 
no t z 
no t z 
not z 
no t z 
no t y 
no t y 
n o t  z 
not x 
not y 
no t z 
not z 
no t z 
no t z 
not z 
no t y 
not x 
not z 
no t z 
no t x 
not y 
no t x 
not x 
not y 
no t x 
no t x 
no t z 
not x 
not x 
not z 
not z 
no t z 
CLUE SHEET 
Columns 
3 
not z 
no t x 
not x 
no t z 
no t x 
no t y 
not y 
n o t  y 
no t y 
no t x 
not y 
not z 
not x 
not y 
no t x 
not z 
not z 
not x 
not z 
not z 
not x 
not x 
not y 
no t x 
not y 
not y 
not y 
no t z 
not z 
no t x 
not x 
no t y 
not x 
not x 
not x 
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not y 
no t z 
no t z 
no t x 
not y 
n o t  x 
not y 
no t x 
no t z 
not z 
n o t  x 
no t y 
not x 
no t x 
no t y 
n o t  y 
no t x 
no t x 
n o t  y 
no t x 
no t x 
nay y 
no t y 
no t y 
no t x 
n o t  y 
not x 
n o t  y 
not y 
no t y 
n o t  y 
n o t  x 
not y 
not x 
no t x 
5 
not x 
not z 
no t z 
not z 
not x 
no t x 
not z 
no t z 
not x 
n o t  y 
not x 
no t z 
not z 
not y 
no t z 
not x 
not x 
not z 
not x 
not y 
no t y 
not x 
no t z 
no t z 
no t z 
not z 
not z 
not x 
n o t  y 
not y 
not y 
no t z 
no t x 
not y 
not y 
Number 
6 
not z 
not y 
no t x 
no t x 
not y 
no t y 
no t x 
not x 
not z 
no t x 
not y 
not x 
no t z 
not x 
not x 
not y 
no t y 
not y 
not x 
not z 
not y 
n o t  x 
no t z 
not x 
not z 
no t z 
not x 
not y 
no t x 
not z 
not z 
not y 
no t z 
no t y 
no t y 
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Each peri od, the experiment er randomly div ide s t h e  inv e stors into two 
groups of six  each.  When z div i dend i s  paid, six investors  w i l l  
receive clue " not x "  and s i x  w i l l  receive clue "not y . "  Which group 
r e ce iv e s  which clue i s  de term i ne d  by a coin tos s .  Simil ar procedure 
is fol lowed for other div idends . 
Enclosed i s  a clue sh eet a nd predict ion sheet [ s e e  Figures 1 4  
and 1 5 ] . Af ter I announce the row and column, c i r c l e  the appropri ate 
c e l l  on your clue sheet and the appropriate, clue on your predic t i on 
sheet . Make your predi c t i on of div idend for the period.  Af ter al l 
inv e stors  have recorded the div idend predict ion, the out come w i l l  be 
a nnounced.  Record this outcome in the bl ank spa c e . If your 
predict i on i s  correct, c i rcl e th e amount in the win column, otherwise  
c i rc l e  the amount in the l os e  column. 
Do not change your pr edi c t i ons a f ter you h av e  r e corded them. 
At the end a dd up your tot a l  w innings and los s e s  a nd record the 
d i f f erence at the bottom ri ght h and corner of the sheet .  
STEP 3 : EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURES AND RULES OF THE MARKET 
Instruc t i on set 3 was distributed and read a l oud . The 
experim ent e r  i l lustrated a sequence of hypothe t i c a l  transact i ons on 
the bl ackboard so e a ch subj ect woul d under stand how transactions were 
to be recorded on the record sheet and how hi s /her prof i t  woul d be 
c a l culated.  Th e exampl e was d e s i gned t o  minim i z e  i t s normativ e  effect 
on subsequent bidding behav ior . Importa nce of accurate records of a l l  
transa ctions was  emphasized.  
Clue 
Number (Circle One) 
1 not x not y not z 
not x not y not z 
PREDICTION SHEET 
Prediction 
(Circle One) 
x y 
x y z 
FIGURE 15 
Outcome 
JBa 
Subj ect No, 
Win Lose 
($)  ($)  
0 . 25 -0. 10 
0. 25 -0. 10 
Instruction S e t  3 6 [ S ingl e S ecur i ty Marke t s ]
Genera l :  Th i s  i s  a n  experim ent i n  the econom ics  o f  marke t 
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decision making,  Vari ous re search founda tions have prov ided funds for 
thi s  research ,  The instruc t i ons are simpl e,  and if you fol l ow them 
careful ly and make good de c i s i ons,  you m i ght earn a cons i derabl e 
amount of money whi ch w i l l  be paid  t o  you in c a sh ,  
I n  thi s e xperim ent we  are  going to  s imul ate a marke t  i n  which 
you w i l l  buy and s e l l  certif i c a te s in a sequence of market year s .  
At tached t o  the i nst ruct ions you w i l l  find a she e t ,  l abel ed 
i nformation and record shee t [ s e e  Figure 16 ) which helps determ i ne the 
value to you of  any de c i s i ons you m ight m ake , You are not to reveal 
thi s  information t o  anyone . It i s  your own priv ate informat i on. 
The type of currency us e d  in thi s marke t  is francs ,  Al l 
trading and earni ng s  w i l l  be i n  t erm s o f  franc s ,  Each f ranc i s  worth 
$ __ _ to you, Do not reveal thi s  number to anyone , At the end of  
the experiment your f rancs will  be  converted to  dol l ar s  a t  thi s  rate,  
and  you wil l be paid  in dol l a r s .  Not i c e  that t h e  more f rancs you 
earn, the more dol l a r s  you earn, 
Spec i fic Ins t ruc t ions : Your prof i t s  come f rom two source s--
from col l ec t i ng c er t i f i c a te earni ng s  on a l l  cer t i f i ca te s you hol d a t  
the end of  the year and f rom buy ing and s e l l ing c e r t i f i c a te s .  During 
e a ch marke t  year you are free to  purch a s e  or s e l l  as many c e r t i f i c a t e s  
a s  you w i sh, provided y o u  fol l ow the rul e s  below .  For e a ch 
certificate  you hold a t  th e end of the year. you w i l l  be . given one of 
the three numbe r s  of f rancs l i sted  in the margin of your inform a ti on 
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Francs on 
Hand 
and record sheet . Note that e arning s  may be different for dif ferent 
i nvestor s .  The method by which one of the three number s i s  sel ected 
e a ch year i s  expl ained l a ter in these i nstructions . Compute your 
tot a l  certif ica te earnings for a period by mul ti ply ing the earnings 
per cer t i f i ca t e  by the number of certif icate s held.  That is, ( number 
of certif icate s h e l d )  x ( earnings per cer t i f i ca te ) = tot a l  ce rtif icate 
e arnings . Suppo s e  for exampl e that you hold f iv e  cert i f i ca te s  at the 
end of year one . If for that period your earnings are one hundred 
f rancs per cer t i f i cate ( that i s, the number sel ected f rom the margin 
of  your information and record sheet is  100) then your total  
certificate  earnings i n  the year woul d be 5 X 100 = 500 f rancs . Thi s  
number shoul d b e  r ecorded on row 1 9  a t  the end of  the year,  
Sal e s  f rom your certi f i c a te hol dings i ncrease your f rancs on 
h and by the amount of the s a l e  pri ce ,  Simil arly, purch a s e s  reduce 
your f rancs on hand by the amount of the purchase  pri c e ,  Thus y o u  can 
End o f  Year Net Profit 
Trans fer this amount <] 
to your Profit Sheet 
gain or l ose money on the purch a se a nd r e s a l e  of cert i f i ca t e s ,  At the 
end of e a ch year a l l  your holdings a r e  autom a t i c a l ly so l d  to the 
FIGURE 16 experim enter at a price of z ero.  
At  the beginning of ea ch year you are  provided w i th an initial  
holding of cer t i f i c a te s .  Th i s  is  recorded on row 0 of the year ' s 
i nformation and record she e t .  You may se l l  the s e  if y o u  w i sh or you 
may hold them. If you hold a c e r t i f i ca te , then you receive  " ea r nings 
per cer t i f i c a te" a t  the end of the y ea r ,  Not i ce therefore that for 
e a ch certifica te you hold ..!!! l e a s t  the amount shown as " earnings per 
certi f icate . "  You earn thi s  amount i f  you do not sel l that 
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certif icate during the year,  
In a dd i t i on, a t  the beginni ng of each year you are prov ided 
w i th an i ni t i a l  amount of f rancs on hand. Thi s  is a l so recorded on 
row O of each year ' s information and record shee t ,  You may ke ep thi s 
if you w i sh or you m ay use i t  to purcha s e  certifica te s .  
Thus a t  t h e  beginning of each y e a r  you are endowed w i th 
holdings of cert i f i c a te s and f rancs on hand. You are  f ree to buy and 
s e l l  certif icate s a s  you w i sh a ccording to the rul e s  below .  Your 
f rancs on hand a t  the end of the year are determ ine d by your ini tial 
amount of francs on h and, earnings on certificate holdings at the end 
of the year, and by gains and l o s s e s  from purch a s e s  a nd s a l e s  o f  
certifica t e s ,  Al l francs on hand a t  the end of  a year in exc e s s  o f  
francs are  your s to ke ep.  
Informat ion About Dividend s :  Whether the div idend you r e c e iv e  
from the certif i c a t e s  you hol d i s  the x d ividend, the y div idend, or 
the z div idend, shown in the margin of your Inform a t ion and Record 
Sheet, i s  determ i ne d  by the experimenter at the beginning of the year 
by drawing a ball  f rom a bingo c a ge conta ining forty ba l l s  numbered 
one through forty . If the ball  drawn i s  numbered one through
fourteen, x div idend i s  pa id; if the bal l drawn i s  numbered f if teen 
through thirty-two, y div idend i s  paid; if the bal l dr awn i s  numbered 
thi rty-three through forty, z div idend is paid.  
Each year you will  receive a clue as  to what state has not 
occurred. The proce dure for prov iding you the clue s is expl ained 
l a ter . 
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Trad ing and Record ing Rul e s : 
( 1 )  A l l  transact ions are for one certif icate at a time,  Af ter each 
of your s a l e s  or purch a s e s  you must record the TRANSACTION PRICE 
in the appropr i ate column depending on the nature of the 
trans a c t i on, The f irst  trans a c t i on is recorded on row ( 1) and 
succ e e ding trans a c t i ons are  recorded on subsequent r ow s ,  
( 2) Af ter e a ch transa ction you mus t c a l cul ate a nd record your new 
hol dings of cer t i f i c a te s a nd your new francs on hand , Your 
holdings of cert i f i c a t e s  m ay never go below z ero,  Your f rancs on 
hand may never go below z ero.  
(3)  At  the end of  the year record your total  certifica te earnings in 
the l a st column of row 1 9 ,  Compute your end o f  period t ot a l s on 
row 20 by l i st ing c e r t i f ica te holdings and adding tot a l  
c e r t i f i c a te earnings to your f rancs on hand, 
( 4 )  At the end of  the year,  subtract  f rom your f rancs on hand the 
amount l i sted in row 21 and e nter thi s new amount on row 22 , 
Th i s  i s  your prof it for the marke t  year and i s  yours to ke ep,  At 
the end of each marke t  year,  record this number on your prof i t  
sheet,  
(5 )  At  the  end of the experim ent add  up your tot a l  prof i t  on your 
prof i t  sheet and ent e r  thi s sum on row 15 of your profit  sheet 
[ s e e  Fi gure 17] . To convert thi, s number i nto dol l ar s ,  mul tiply 
by the number on row 16 and record the product on row 17 . The 
experiment er w i l l  pay you thi s amount of money , 
4 2 a  
Trader II 
PROFIT SHEET 
Market 
Row Year Pro fi t  
1 1 
2 2 
I 
14 14 
15 To tal Prof i t  ( in Francs )  
1 6  Dollars P e r  Franc 
1 7  To tal Dol la rs Prof i t  
FIGURE 17 
Market Organiza t ion : The marke t  for the se certif ica te s 
i s  organi z ed a s  fol l ow s ,  The marke t will  be conducted  in a 
seri e s  of year s ,  Each period l a s t s  for ��- minut e s ,  Anyone 
w i shing to purchase  a cert i f i c a te i s  f ree to rai se h i s  or her 
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hand and make a verbal bid to buy one certif icate a t  a specif ied 
price,  and a nyone w i th ce r t i f i c a t e s  to sell i s  free to a·ccept or 
not a ccept the bid. Likew i s e ,  anyone w i shi ng to s e l l  a 
cer t i f i ca te i s  free to rai s e  h i s  or her hand and . ma ke a verbal 
offer to s e l l  one certif ica te a t  a spe c i f ied pri ce , If a bid or  
offer is  a ccepted, a binding cont r a ct h a s  been c l o s e d  for a 
singl e certif icate , and the contract i ng part i e s  w i l l  record the 
trans a c t i on on their inform a t i on a nd record shee t s .  Any t i e s  i n  
bids or  accept ance w i l l  b e  re solved by random choi c e , Exce pt for 
the b i ds and their acceptance, you are not to speak t o  a ny other 
subj ect , Th ere are l ikely to be many bids that are not accepted, 
but you are  free to keep try ing,  You are  free  to m ake a s  much 
prof i t  a s  you can, 
Instruc t ion Set 4 [ Cont ingent Cl aims Marke t s ]  
Genera l : Thi s  i s  a n  e xperim ent in the econom ics  of 
marke t deci s i on making ,  Various r e s e ar ch founda t i on s  h ave 
provided funds for thi s  rese arch. The instructions a r e  simpl e, 
and i f  you fol l ow them careful ly and make good deci s i ons, you 
m i ght earn a consi derabl e amount of money which w i l l  be paid t o  
you i n  c a sh. 
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In thi s experim ent we  are goi ng to simul ate a marke t in 
which you w i l l  buy and s e l l  three type s of certificates  in a 
sequence of marke t years.  At tached to the  instruct i ons you will  
f ind a shee t ,  labe l ed information a nd record sheet [ s e e  Fi gure 
18 ] ,  which helps determine the value to you of  any decisions you 
m i ght m ake , You are  not to reveal  thi s information to anyone . 
It i s  your own priv ate information. 
The type of currency us e d  i n  this marke t  is francs . Al l 
trading a nd e arnings w i l l  be in term s  of f ranc s .  Ea ch franc i s  
worth do l l ar s  to you. Do not reveal thi s  number to 
a nyone , At the end of the experim ent your f rancs w i l l  be 
converted to do l l ar s  at thi s rate,  and you w i l l  be pa i d  in 
dol l a r s ,  Not i ce th at the more f rancs you e ar n, the  more do l l ars  
you e a r n, 
Spe c i fic  Instruc t ions : Dur ing e a ch m arke t  year you are  
f ree to purch a s e  or sel l a s  many cer t i f i c a t e s  a s  you w i sh, 
provided you f ol l ow the rul e s  below .  Three type s of secur i t i e s  
are : type x, type y ,  a n d  type z .  Your prof i t s  come from two 
source s--from col l e ct i ng certifica te earni ngs on a l l  cert if ica te s 
you hol d a t  the end of the year and f rom buy ing a nd s e l l ing 
c e r t i f i cate s ,  During e a ch marke t  y ear you a r e  f re e  t o  purch a s e  
o r  s e l l  a s  many cer t i f i ca t e s  a s  y o u  w i sh, prov ided you fol low the
rul e s  below.  
For ea ch certi f i cate y ou hold a t  the end of the year you 
w i l l  earn one of th e three numbe r s  of f rancs l i sted on row 26 of 
45 
your information and record.  shee t ,  Compute your tot a l  
cert i f i ca te earnings f o r  a period by mul tiply ing the earnings per 
cert i f i ca te by the number of each type of cert i f i c a t e s  h e l d .  Th e 
me thod by which one of the three numbers  i s  sel ected each year i s  
e xpl ained l a ter in these instruc t i ons , Note that earnings are  
diff erent for diff erent type s of certifica te s a nd may be 
diff erent for diff erent i nv e stor s .  
Suppo s e  for exampl e that you hol d f iv e  c e r t i f i ca t e s  of  
type x a t  th e end of  year one and none of  the other two. If for 
that period your earnings are one hundred f rancs per x-type 
c e r t i f i ca t e  ( that i s, the number s e l e cted f rom row 26 is 100 ) 
then your tot a l  certificate earnings in the year woul d be 
5 x 100 500 francs . Thi s  number should be r ecorded on row 7 a t  
t h e  end of  th e year . 
( number of x certifica te s held)  X ( earnings per x c e r t i f icate ) 
= earnings f rom x certif i ca te s 
S a l e s  f rom your certifica te holdings incre a s e  your f rancs 
on hand by the amount of the sal e  pr i ce , Simil arly, purchase s 
r educe your f rancs on hand by th e amount of the purchase pri ce , 
Thus you c a n  gain  or l ose money on the purch a se and resa l e  of 
c e r t i f i ca t e s .  At the end of each y ear, a l l  your holdings a r e  
automatical ly sol d  to t h e  experiment er at a price o f  0 ,  
At the be ginning of each year you are prov ided w i th an 
ini t i al hol ding of each type of certif ica t e ,• Thi s  i s  recorded on 
4 5  a 
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row 0 of the year ' s inf orm a t i on and record shee t ,  You m ay sel l 
the s e  if you w i sh or you may hold them,  If you hold a 
certificate,  then you receiv e  tt earni ngs per cert i f i c a te" at the 
end of the yea r ,  Not ice therefore that for each cert i f i ca te you 
hold ini tially you can earn this  amount if you do not s e l l  that 
cert i f i ca te dur i ng the year.  
In  additi on, a t  the  beginning of each y ear y ou are  
prov ided w i th an ini tial amount of francs on hand, Th i s  is  a l so 
recorded on row 0 of each year' s i nform a t i on and r ecord sh eet.  
You m ay keep thi s i f  you w i sh or you may use it  to  purchase 
cert ificate s .  
Thus a t  the beginning o f  each year you a r e  endowed with 
holdings o f  cert i f i c a t e s  and f rancs on hand. You are  f ree to buy 
and s e l l  certi f i c a t e s  a s  you w i sh according t o  the rul e s  below .  
Your f rancs on h and a t  the end o f  a year a r e  de term ined by your 
ini t i al amount of f rancs on h and, earnings on cert i f i c a te 
holdings a t  the end of the year, and by gains and l o s s e s  f rom 
purch a s e s  and s a l e s  of certifica t e s ,  Al l francs �n hand a t  the 
end of a year in exc e s s of ---- francs are  your s to ke ep. 
The s e  are your prof its for the year,  
Information about D ividend s :  Whether the  div i dend you 
receive f rom the certifica te s you hold is the x d iv idend, the y 
div i dend or th e z div idend shown on row 26 is de termined by the 
experiment er at th e beginning of the year by draw ing a bal l from 
a bi ngo cage cont a i ning thirty- s i x  b a l l s  numbered one through 
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thi rty- six.  If the ba l l  drawn is  numbered one through twelve, x 
div idend i s  paid; if the ball  drawn i s  numbered thirteen through 
twenty- four, y div idend is paid; if the bal l drawn i s  numbered 
tw enty- five through thi rty- s i x, the z div idend i s  paid. 
Each year you will  receive a clue as to  what state has 
not occurred.  The procedure for providing you the clue s i s  . 
exp l a ine d 1 ater . 
Trad ing and Record ing Rul e s : 
( 1 )  A l l  transa c t i ons are for one c e r t i f i ca t e  at a tim e ,  Af ter 
each of your s a l e s  or purch a s e s, you must record the 
TRANSACTION PRICE in the appropri ate column depending o n  the 
na ture of the transact i on,  The f ir st transa c t i on i s  
r ecorded o n  row ( 1 )  a nd succee ding transactions a r e  recorded 
on subsequent row s .  
( 2 )  After e a ch transaction y o u  must c a l culate  and record your 
new holdings of cert i f i c a t e s  and your new francs on hand, 
Your holdings o f  any type of certi f i c a t e s  must not be below 
z ero at the end of the peri od, For ev ery cer t i f ic a te 
tt short, " a f i ne must be paid  equa l to the high e st pri c e  a t  
which any uni t  i s  sol d  dur i ng the peri od, plus __ _ 
francs , 
( 3 ) At the end of the year r e cord your tot a l  certifica te · 
earnings in the l a st column of row 27 , Compute your end o f  
pe riod total  franc s o n  row 28 , 
( 4 )  Subtract f rom total francs ( 28 )  the amount l i sted in row 2 9  
and enter thi s  new amount on row 3 0 .  Thi s  i s  your prof it 
for the marke t year and i s  your s to ke ep,  At the end of  
each m arket year,  record thi s number on your prof i t  she e t .  
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( S) At the end of  the experiment add up your tota l prof i t  on 
your pro f i t  sheet and enter thi s  sum on row 21 of your 
prof i t  she e t .  To conv ert thi s  number into do l l ars,  mul tiply 
by the number on row 22 and record the product on row 23 . 
The experiment er w i l l  pay you this amount of money , 
Market Organization:  The marke t  for the s e  cert i f i cate s 
i s  organi z ed a s  fol l ow s .  The marke t  w i l l  b e  conducted i n  a 
seri e s  o f  year s .  Each period l a st s for �� minut e s .  Anyone 
w i shing to purchase  a certif icate i s  f re e  to r ai se hi s or her 
hand and make a v erbal bid t o  buy one certi f i cate  of spe c i f ied 
type at  a spe c i f i e d  price, and anyone w i th certificates  t o  s e l l  
i s  f ree to a ccept o r  not a ccept t h e  bid,  Likew ise,  anyone 
w i shing to s e l l  a certif ica te of any type i s  free to rai s e  h i s  or 
her hand a nd make a v erbal offer to s e l l  one certif icate at  a 
spe c i f i e d  price . If a b i d  or offer i s  accepted, a binding 
cont r act h a s  been closed for a singl e cert i f i ca te ,  and the 
cont r a c t i ng p a r t i e s  will record the transa c t i on on the i r  
information a nd record shee t s .  Any t i e s  i n  b i d s  or acceptance 
wil l be r e solved by random choi ce . Except for the bi ds a nd their 
acceptance, you are not t o  speak t o  any other subj ect . There are 
l ikely to be m any bids that are not accepted, but you are free to 
kee p  trying . You are free to make a s  much prof it a s  you can. 
Instruc t ion Set 4 - Supplement [Cont i ngent Claims Marke t ]  
4 9  
For the next s ev eral periods the three secur i t i e s  w i l l  be 
merged i nto a si ngl e compound s e curi ty .  Th i s  s ingl e secur i ty ha s 
for ea ch of you, your div idend v alue of the pr ev i ous x s ecur i ty 
shoul d the state x occur . It h a s  for each of you your div idend 
value of the y .securi ty shoul d the state y occur, and i t  has  ·the 
value of the z secur i ty shoul d the state z occur . The s e  div idend 
values are shown in row 1 9  of your information a nd r ecord shee t. 
As you can see thi s  s e curi ty i s  l ike the x s ecur i ty when 
x occurs,  the y secur i ty when y occurs and the z securi ty when z 
occur s .  Thus one po s s i bi l i ty i s  that the marke t  price of thi s 
compound s e cur i ty in a ny giv en state w i l l  be similar to the price 
of th e x secur i ty when x occurs,  the y secur i ty when y occurs,  
and the z security when z occur s .  
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FOOTNOTEi: 
• The author s grate fully acknowl edge the suppo rt of the National
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Sci ence Founda t i on, the Cal te ch Program for Enterpr i s e  a nd Publ i c  
Pol i cy ,  t h e  Univ e r s i ty o f  Ch i cago Inst i tute of Prof e s s i ona l 
Account ing, and the Indi an In st i tut e of Mana gement at Ahmedabad,  
l ,  A pe nal ty of 3 00 francs plus the hi ghe st  transact ion pr i ce tr aded 
during the period was impo sed for each short un i t .  Only once 
( marke t  4 ,  period 9) did a trader end a period in a net short 
po s i ti on, 
2 ,  S ince the RE equil ibrium pr ice of y and z s e curi t i e s  unde r state  x 
i s  z ero, the mode l actua l ly make s no predicti ons about 
a l l ocation s ,  If we a s sume that th e inv e stors  w i l l  not i ncur the 
pecun i a ry or psychol ogical c o s t s  of conducting  a trans act ion 
w ithout expectat ion of gain  from it,  th e z ero trade prediction 
fol l ow s ,  Some ev idence o n  reluctance of inv e stors to enter trade s 
whi ch have zero e xpected ·  bene f i t i s  av a i l abl e in the experimental 
l i terature (Pl ott a nd Smith 1 978 ) , 
3 .  One could i nterpret thi s  a s  an a l terna t iv e  to the exp e c t e d  util ity 
hypo the s i s  a s  oppo sed to a diff erence in be l i ef structur e s  between 
the mode l s ,  
4 ,  Buy-and-Ho l d :  buy one cert i f i cate a t  opening transaction pri ce of 
each period; l iquidate at cl os ing trans a c t i on pr i ce of each 
period,  
Trend F i l t e r :  observe transa c t i on price trend f rom opening to 
current pr i c e ;  if po s i tive,  buy if ne c e s s a ry to hold one 
c e r t i f i c a t e ;  if ne ga tiv e ,  sell if ne c e s sary to m a i nt a i n  a short 
po s i tion of  one certi f icate , Liquidate at c l o s ing transaction 
pri ce , 
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y--Franc F i l t e r :  i f  transa ction pr i ce goe s  up by y or  more franc s ,  
buy i f  ne c e s s a ry t o  hold one certif icate unt il the p r i c e  goe s  down 
by y or more f rancs at whi ch t ime s e l l ,  if ne c e s s ary to maintain  a 
short po s i t i on of one c e r t if icate unt i l  the price goe s  up a g a i n  by 
y or more francs , Liqui da te at c l osing p r i c e .  
5 .  The numbe r s  in thi s  f i r st paragr aph w e r e  a l tered appropri a tely for 
each expe riment , 
6 .  Language of th e s e  instruct ions w a s  sui tably al tered for cont ingent 
c l a im s  a nd for the uni f orm div idend marke t s ,  The de s i gn of 
inform a t i on and record sheets  for the s i ngl e s e cur i ty and 
conting e nt cl aims marke t s  was diff erent a s  shown, 
